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Part I
Dissertation overview
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Dissertation overview
Crises are an intensely debated topic both inside and outside scientific research.
They are frequently observed in areas such as finance, society, and politics. This
dissertation takes up the discussion by presenting three recent research projects on
selected economic crises of topical interest. Each chapter deals with a particular
and, in the broad sense of the term, economic crisis within financial networks, small
organizations, or international politics. In this respect, it can be positioned at the
intersection of societal and financial topics analyzed by means of experimental and
empirical methods.
Chapter 1 is inspired by one of the worst economic and financial crises in mod-
ern history which we experienced only recently, and which is comparable only to
the Great Depression taking its course with the historical stock market crash in
the United States on 24 October 1929. Starting with the US subprime mortgage
crisis in 2007, this financial crisis contagiously spread through the network of fi-
nancial institutions, agents, and securities. One prominent example and element of
the financial crisis is bank runs and their possible contagion through financial net-
works, which is studied in Chapter 1, titled “An experiment on the occurrence and
propagation of silent bank runs through incomplete financial networks”. There, we
design a laboratory experiment where a minimum example of an incomplete net-
work of banking institutions serves as the framework for analyzing the emergence
and spread of silent bank runs over time. We find that the immediate experience
of declines in net bank profits is an important driving factor in generating bank
runs in a dynamic setting. Also, after experiencing a run on a bank with poor
performance history, agents tend to withdraw larger amounts from other banks in
the time after the run.
Chapter 2, titled “Can scapegoating explain persistent low-level group perfor-
mance?”, builds on the idea of a crisis emerging after a lost football match where
the coach of the losing team is replaced. This phenomenon can be observed rather
frequently in the daily press. Here, we propose a stylized experiment with a gener-
alized setting to study whether the mechanism behind the dismissal of coaches after
poor group performance is scapegoating, and if so, whether this affects future team
performance. We find that up to 40% of groups with relative poor performance
knowingly assign responsibility for their situation to their coach, when in fact they
are fully aware that they caused this result themselves, and are thus scapegoating
by definition. We also find that groups who scapegoat are less likely to increase
their performance over time.
Finally, Chapter A, titled “The war puzzle: Contradictory effects of interna-
tional conflicts on stock markets”, is jointly written with Thorsten Hens, Marc
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Oliver Rieger, and Mei Wang and published in the International Review of Eco-
nomics in 2015. This chapter studies the response of international stock market
indices toward changes in the climate of conflicts while distinguishing between fore-
seeable and sudden wars. We find that a larger probability of an imminent war
decreases stock prices, whereas the actual outbreak of war increases them. In con-
trast, a sudden and unexpected outbreak of war decreases stock prices.
In conclusion, this dissertation unites research on three interesting topics in
current crises on financial networks (Chapter 1), small organizations (Chapter 2),
and international politics (Chapter A), with which we hope to be able to contribute
to the current crisis literature.
4
Part II
Research papers
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Chapter 1
An experiment on the occurrence and propagation
of silent bank runs through incomplete financial
networks
Amelie Brune
Abstract. The contribution of this paper is to study the circumstances under
which silent bank runs occur and spread through incomplete financial networks.
To this end, we design a dynamic laboratory experiment where subjects manage
their deposit portfolios across three banks with different economic interdependen-
cies. Treatments differ with respect to the information set available to the subject,
consisting of knowledge about the bank projects’ return distributions as well as un-
derlying network structures between banks. Our findings suggest that rather than
the information set available about banks, the immediate experience of declines in
net profits is an important driving factor in generating bank runs in a dynamic
setting. After experiencing a run on a bank with poor performance history, indi-
viduals tend to withdraw more funds from other banks in the subsequent period.
As a tentative recommendation for policy makers, information issued about bank
performance shall be organized in a careful manner.
JEL classification: C91, D81, G01, G02, G11, G21, G28, L14.
Keywords: Laboratory experiments, bank runs, contagion, networks, financial
crises, financial market regulation, systemic risk, behavioral finance.
1.1 Introduction
Bank runs are an unnerving, but re-occurring phenomenon in financial markets.
Like the burst of speculative bubbles, they create severe damage to the economy
and have the potential to permanently destroy the agents’ trust into the financial
system. Not only the circumstance that they often seem to happen unexpectedly,
but also the possibility of them spreading though the financial system both add a
layer of complexity to this problem.
With the degree of interconnectedness in today’s financial markets and society,
the risk of contagion of bank runs seems unprecedented in economic history. From
an economic point of view, the collapse of any given bank can have detrimental
effects on up- and downstream financial institutions. Turning to the depositor’s
perspective, updating beliefs about bank performance can trigger a bank run, and
eroding trust can lead to a spread of bank runs through the system. Therefore, it
should be of utmost importance to identify the reasons for bank runs to both occur
and spread, and to find ways of efficiently reducing the probability of both.
From a theoretical perspective, bank runs have been studied since the early
1980s. The literature distinguishes between two channels of bank run formation:
Bank runs triggered through beliefs about other depositors’ withdrawal behavior,
and bank runs triggered through beliefs about the bank’s solvency.
The first channel is described in the seminal contribution by Diamond and Dy-
bvig [1983], who present their theoretical model of bank runs being caused by a
change in individual expectations regarding the withdrawal behavior of other de-
positors. A bank run is one out of two possible symmetric Nash equilibria that
this model generates, with both depositors deciding to withdraw their funds from
the bank rather than keeping them. This type of bank run is generally known as
self-fulfilling or panic-based, as the belief in an imminent bank run itself induces
people to excessively withdraw deposits and therewith cause the bank to collapse.
However, there is no objective reason to withdraw deposits from the respective
bank such as, for example, the knowledge about an imminent, fundamentals-based
bankruptcy. In order to prevent bank runs, the authors propose a temporary sus-
pension of deposit convertibility as well as the introduction of a deposit insurance
scheme provided by the government as potential mechanisms. The second channel
is postulated by Chari and Jagannathan [1988], who suggest that bank runs are
created through updated beliefs about a bank’s degree of solvency, thus giving rise
to information-based bank runs. They propose a model in which the observation of
emerging queues in front of banks informs other depositors about a possible bank
insolvency, and also come to the conclusion that policies such as the suspension
of convertibility may be a possible means in order to prevent bank runs (cf. Dia-
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mond and Dybvig [1983]). We build on this perception of bank run emergence in
our experimental design later on, however in the framework of silent bank runs,
i.e., where adverse information about bank solvency is not conveyed through lines
forming in front of a bank, but rather through individually accessible information
about past bank performance.
For the past decade, researchers have been studying the determinants of bank
runs by means of controlled laboratory experiments. Where field data of depositors’
decisions in the time leading up to and during a bank run is either not available
or rather difficult to analyze with respect to causal effects, laboratory experiments
can allow for a precise identification of a bank run’s trigger, and moreover provide
an excellent possibility to generate other unique insights into the mechanism (see
Madie`s [2006], Schotter and Yorulmazer [2009], and Kiss, Rodr´ıguez-Lara, and
Rosa-Garc´ıa [2012]).
Madie`s [2006] was the first to experimentally test the Diamond and Dybvig
[1983] model of pure-panic bank runs. In his paper, he focuses on deposit insurance
and temporary suspension of deposit convertibility, and investigates which degree
of deposit insurance is capable of avoiding a self-fulfilling bank run. Abstracting the
experimental situation in every period to two individuals whose possible decisions
are to withdraw or not to withdraw their deposits at a given bank, this is a one-shot
game with simultaneous decisions from a game theoretical point of view. Given the
expected payoffs related to each decision and the possible decisions of the other
player, each player chooses his best strategy. The result is two Nash equilibria
in pure strategies, where both players make the same decision: If both players
withdraw their deposits, a bank run occurs; if no player withdraws his deposits, the
status quo is maintained. Based on the authors’s finding that a decreasing level of
partial deposit insurance would increase the probability of the occurrence of a bank
run, he argues that only a complete deposit insurance scheme is effectively capable
of preventing this type of coordination failure. Once a bank run has started, his
experiments show that it can be stopped through a temporary suspension of deposit
convertibility.
In later studies, most authors focus on the effects of various determinants on
the probability of a bank run at an individual bank, again building on the co-
ordination game by Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. Including the work by Madie`s
[2006], they provide evidence for a negative effect of liquidity (Madie`s [2006]), tem-
porary suspension of deposit convertibility (Madie`s [2006]), information about the
current crisis and the presence of insiders who know about the bank’s asset qual-
ity (Schotter and Yorulmazer [2009]), the observability of a depositor’s withdrawal
actions by other depositors who are positioned behind him within a social net-
work (Kiss, Rodr´ıguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garc´ıa [2014a]), cognitive abilities (Kiss,
Rodr´ıguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garc´ıa [2016]), deposit insurance (Madie`s [2006], Schot-
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ter and Yorulmazer [2009], Kiss, Rodr´ıguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garc´ıa [2012]), and
knowledge about group financial literacy in large banks (Campioni, Larocca, Mirra,
and Panaccione [2017]). Schotter and Yorulmazer [2009] provide evidence even for
the case of dynamic, information-based bank runs. Unlike their pure-panic coun-
terpart, in this type of bank runs depositors’ withdrawals are motivated by their
knowledge about an actually impending insolvency of the bank and are thus ob-
jectively founded. A positive effect on the probability of bank run occurrence is
found for macroeconomic uncertainty (Garratt and Keister [2009]), the number of
withdrawal opportunities (Garratt and Keister [2009]), the degree of coordination
required among depositors (Arifovic, Jiang, and Xu [2013]), the level of risk sharing,
i.e., the expected payoff in the event of early withdrawals (Klos and Stra¨ter [2013]),
and the knowledge of group financial literacy in small banks (Campioni, Larocca,
Mirra, and Panaccione [2017]). Public announcements in times of uncertainty may
either increase or decrease the likelihood of bank runs depending on their wording
and publication circumstances (Arifovic and Jiang [2014]). Gender differences do
not seem to matter (Kiss, Rodr´ıguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garc´ıa [2014b]). Also, the
results about the effect of deposit insurance are still somewhat mixed, since Kiss,
Rodr´ıguez-Lara, and Rosa-Garc´ıa [2012] provide evidence for a positive impact on
the reduction of the occurrence probability of bank runs. Moreover, the authors
can show that the observability of decisions made by other depositors has an effect
on the optimal degree of deposit insurance. This result has direct consequences
for respective policies, as these can be assessed as the less expensive alternative to
avoid bank runs in the case of sequential decisions of depositors.
If the depositors at any given bank lose their trust in their bank’s sensible
deployment of their deposits, a simultaneous decision to withdraw funds can lead
to a bank run, which has the potential to spread through the financial system by
means of beliefs updated with respect to bank fundamentals or other depositors’
behavior. As such, even previously uninvolved and healthy banking institutions
can suffer a run on themselves. A case where an initial local crisis is transmitted
through the system is also known as contagion, which was studied by a smaller
group of authors in the context of banks runs.
Chakravarty, Fonseca, and Kaplan [2014] and Brown, Trautmann, and Vlahu
[2016] study the mechanisms and characteristics of bank run contagion within an
experimental two-bank framework. Based on the bank run coordination game by
Diamond and Dybvig [1983], both groups of authors construct a banking environ-
ment where two banks are either linked through identical asset quality or liquida-
tion values, respectively, or have no such connection. Banks can have two different
quality levels. Subjects at the first bank know their bank’s fundamentals and make
their withdrawal decisions. This outcome is observed by subjects at the downstream
bank, upon which they proceed to make their own withdrawal decisions. They do
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not know any bank’s fundamental values. In the paper by Brown, Trautmann,
and Vlahu [2016], downstream depositors also know that upstream depositors are
aware of their bank’s quality when making their withdrawal decisions, as well as
their bank’s relation to the upstream bank. The authors find evidence for bank run
contagion only in the event of existing economic linkages between the two banks.
The channel of bank run transmission is reported to be the subjects’ updated beliefs
regarding the other depositors’ likelihood to withdraw their funds, which relates to
the concept of panic-based contagion. In contrast, Chakravarty, Fonseca, and Ka-
plan [2014] find support for contagion taking place even in absence of liquidity
dependencies. If banks are connected, they report evidence for information-based
contagion based on the mechanism that beliefs about the liquidity level of a bank
are responsible for bank run contagion. In the case where banks are independent,
they find support for panic-based contagion, i.e., bank runs spreading from the first
to the second bank based on updated beliefs about other depositors’ withdrawal
behavior.
Although both studies are similar in their theoretical setup and research focus,
their results are somehow inconclusive, which may also be due to differences in
their designs, such as the explicit measurement of beliefs in Brown, Trautmann,
and Vlahu [2016], but not in Chakravarty, Fonseca, and Kaplan [2014]. For ex-
ample, there is evidence for panic-based contagion in both settings of connected
and unconnected banks, which makes it rather difficult to draw precise conclusions
about the occurrence of information-based and panic-based bank run contagion.
Duffy, Karadimitropoulou, and Parravano [2016] take the experimental analysis
of bank run contagion one step further. With their goal of testing the model of
financial contagion as proposed by Allen and Gale [2000], they conduct experiments
with complete and incomplete symmetric network structures among four banks,
where in the former each bank invests a fraction of deposits in every other bank
within the network, while in the latter each bank invests only into its immediate
neighboring bank. The network pattern is common knowledge among subjects.
The authors find that, while a complete interbank network can partially hedge
for bank run contagion as initiated through a liquidity shock to one particular
bank, incomplete interbank networks always lead to complete contagion through
the network. As such, full co-insurance between banking institutions with the aim
of increasing their capacity to meet depositors’ liquidity demand can be regarded
as a means to efficiently share risk within the network. The authors do not address
the issue of information-based versus panic-based contagion.
In contrast to the approach which was chosen by the authors of the three papers
studying bank run contagion, our paper is not based on the model by Diamond
and Dybvig [1983] or Allen and Gale [2000]. Rather than letting subjects play
a series of one-shot coordination games, we decide to follow a novel approach by
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introducing an intrinsically dynamic setting where subjects are free to update their
initial portfolio of bank deposits across all operating banks in each of 20 periods.
Instead of performing the binary decision whether or not to withdraw all of their
funds at a bank, subjects can both choose to withdraw and re-deposit a continuum
of funds into any operating bank. As such, subjects are not restricted to deposit
funds at one bank only. We also argue that, by assigning subjects to play the role of
specific depositor types (namely, patient and impatient depositors), the use of the
model by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] (or extended versions thereof) or by Allen and
Gale [2000] in an experimental setting restricts subjects in their portfolio decisions.
By lifting these assumptions, we hope to add more realism to the design, especially
as these two types vary in each period in the paper by Chakravarty, Fonseca, and
Kaplan [2014], thereby restricting realism even further. Moreover, nowadays – at
least in the industrialized countries – bank runs do not necessarily have to manifest
themselves through visible queues of depositors wishing to withdraw their money
in front of cash machines. In times of fast and simple electronic cash transfers
accessible for individual depositors, bank runs may be silent, such as the silent
run on Wachovia in 2008, for instance. This topical situation is captured by our
experimental design, as well: Subjects can only observe the banks’ performance and
decide on how to manage their private portfolio of cash and bank deposits. However,
they are not able to observe other depositors’ behavior and actions, mirroring the
case of electronic money transfer. This is an important feature incorporated in our
experiment.
Similar to Duffy, Karadimitropoulou, and Parravano [2016], we argue that bank
run contagion within a network can only be studied effectively when more than two
banks are involved. However, in this paper we aim to analyze contagion within an
asymmetric network of banking institutions, where banks A and B are connected
through economic linkages, but bank C is independent of either bank A or B. This
follows up to the afore-mentioned authors’ comment that future research could
investigate asymmetric financial networks, which we aim to study in a simple setting
to begin with. We also add to their contribution by addressing the issue of dynamics
as elaborated on in the preceding paragraph.
The goal of this paper is to attempt a reconciliation of the results obtained
by previous studies on bank run contagion by introducing an incomplete three-
bank network, where bank A and bank B are economically linked while bank C is
independent of both bank A and bank B. The idea of introducing networks into
economics is nothing else than a generalization of competitive markets or games,
which can both be modeled as special types of networks. Kirman [2011] (p. 29)
puts it in a nutshell, saying that
“[a] perfectly competitive market might be thought of as a star with indi-
12
viduals linked to a central price setter, such as an auctioneer. A game-
theoretical model in which the nodes are the individuals would have ev-
ery node linked to every other one, since all the players consider the
actions and reasoning of all the others. This would be a complete graph.
The graph corresponding to real economic situations is somewhere in
between, with densely linked local clusters linked by longer links to other
clusters.”
A network can be characterized by the identity and size of its nodes, their prox-
imity to each other, their connectivity through links as well as these links’ length
and strength. The propagation of information from one node to another through
any network as well as its speed is essentially governed by these parameters. As im-
plied by Kirman [2011], these links between nodes are intrinsically unstable, since
they are created and destroyed by economic agents over time. The destruction
probability of any link could hence be described as a function of the link’s past
quality, which can be interpreted as the degree of trust experienced between its
corresponding nodes, for instance, in turn depending on the frequency of the link’s
use and the volume of information proceeded. These properties can be described
by the link’s thickness. An example for the endogenously triggered instability of
any network is the sudden destruction of links connecting a given node to its neigh-
bors. This sudden abandonment of this node can lead to a partial implosion of the
network. In economic terms, the resulting destruction of value is even more detri-
mental if the considered node is located within a sufficiently large number of other
nodes in close proximity to and with high connectivity to each other. In extreme
cases, this setup can even trigger a collapse of the entire network structure. Since
the underlying structure of today’s financial markets can perfectly be described by
a complicated network, the aforementioned parameters can play a decisive role in
governing market outcomes. In fact, they can be regarded as one possible factor
for endogenously emerging financial crises.
For our experimental framework, we decide to apply a compact version of the
incomplete graph described by Kirman [2011]. The nodes in this network are three
different banking institutions of equal size, where two of them are economically
connected, which may be thought of as interbank lending, while the third bank is
independent from the other two banks. One may argue that it does not seem to
be too realistic to include a bank in the network without any connections to other
financial institutions. However, experiments which are conducted in the laboratory
have to abstract from reality to some extent in order to reduce information com-
plexity for the subjects. The missing link to other banks may be interpreted as a
minor connection whose economic or psychological value can be neglected without
detriment of the basic framework. The lending volume and general characteris-
13
tics of the relation between two banks represent the strength and implicitly also
the length of this link, where a lower degree of financial activity between any two
banking institutions can be represented by a link of increased length. The main
difference between Kirman [2011]’s and our interpretation of networks is the differ-
ent identity of nodes: In our experiment, the nodes in the core network are banking
institutions rather than individuals. They establish the experimental framework.
Subjects can be interpreted as an outer layer to the core network. As a conse-
quence, the stability of the core financial network is determined exogenously rather
than endogenously here. However, the outer layer to the core network does feature
endogenous links, i.e., the individually determined connections to different bank-
ing institutions. These are in fact created and destroyed by subjects over time by
means of their portfolio decisions. As mentioned above, the destruction probability
of such a link depends on the degree of trust experienced between the subject and
the bank in previous periods.
Our incomplete three-bank network may then be thought of as a minimal exam-
ple of the graph described above. In this setup, there is scope for both information-
based contagion (for instance, from A to B) and panic-based contagion (for instance,
from A to C) within the same experiment. From a technical point of view, most
previous experimental research on bank runs primarily focused on the outcome of
one-shot coordination games set up against the background of bank runs. For a real-
istic analysis of bank runs, this approach falls short of two important aspects. One,
bank runs emerge from a particular investment history combined with unsettled
depositors. One-shot games do not adequately cater for the long-run perspective of
bank runs, but are rather likely to produce mere happenstance results. And two,
one-shot bank run games essentially are coordination games, i.e., the result is some
sort of coordination on a certain outcome. The matter of coordination does not
need to be the decision whether or not to withdraw deposits from a certain bank,
but may evolve around any other type of coordination problem. Hence, any results
obtained from such one-shots games do not uniquely have to be related to bank
runs. In order to enrich previous research in this respect and make it more realistic,
we use a dynamic game with a maximum duration of 20 periods where each bank
invests into a profitable one-period project and subjects are free to update their
bank portfolios each period.
To summarize, the ultimate purpose of this paper is to identify the circum-
stances under which bank runs arise and spread through a network of financial
institutions. Problems such as the effect of bank runs and their spread to economi-
cally related banks on the state of economically independent banks, the probability
of depositors running at their economically independent bank after having experi-
enced a bank run at other banks in the system, or the question of how this depends
on the knowledge of existing economic linkages are of utmost importance to all
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stake-holders. It may enable them to prepare for the event that a given part of
the financial system experiences difficulties, and take appropriate precautions to
shield healthy, independent banks from suffering from contagion. The knowledge
of how exactly it is that depositors behave during a bank run, at a bank concerned
or not, and how this is influenced by the existence and knowledge of network struc-
tures may help regulators and policy makers in designing more appropriate rules to
mitigate the occurrence and spread of bank runs, and therefore reducing harm to
the economy as a whole. The economic and psychological damage created through
bank runs, or at least their near realization, can be mitigated and the protection
of private depositors enhanced.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes our
experimental hypotheses. Section 1.3 describes the experimental design, Section
1.4 presents our behavioral predictions, and Section 1.5 analyses the data obtained
from the laboratory experiment. Section 1.6 discusses the results obtained and
offers concluding remarks.
1.2 Hypotheses
In this paper, we are interested in the occurrence and spread of bank runs within
an incomplete three-bank experimental network. We suggest an explorative exper-
iment, as described in the following section, which addresses a variety of issues in
previous research as elaborated on in Section 1.1. We propose one variable each to
characterize the occurrence and the spread of a bank run, respectively. Regarding
the former, we suggest using information about the return distribution of a bank’s
background investment projects in order to capture bank performance and, thus,
the likelihood that a bank may face a run for reasons of depositors’ beliefs about
deteriorating bank solvency. According to Hens [2008], negative signals about the
quality of the bank’s investment project can lead to a lack of trust in the bank,
which can eventually lead to a bank run and to the bank’s liquidation. Regarding
the latter, i.e., the spread of a run, we suggest using information about the existence
of network structures between banks. As such, we hypothesize that a depositor’s
knowledge about such existing or missing connections may drive his beliefs about
neighboring banks suffering from contagion. Combining these two variables gives
us a 2 × 2 design which is described in detail in Section 1.4. This is in order to
ease the understanding of our behavioral predictions based on the features of the
experimental design.
We present our hypotheses in Table 2.1. To anticipate our predictions, we ex-
pect economic and psychological spillover effects to be observed between bank A
and bank B depending on their timing within the dynamic 20-period framework.
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H1: If the return distribution of bank projects is known and the network structure
among banks is not known, no bank run occurs at any bank.
H2 (a): If neither the return distribution of bank projects nor the network structure
among banks is known, information-based bank runs at banks A and B occur.
H2 (b): If neither the return distribution of bank projects nor the network structure
among banks is known, an information-based bank run at bank A does not
spread to bank B to cause a panic-based bank run there.
H3 (a): If the return distribution of bank projects is not known, but the network
structure of banks is, information-based bank runs at banks A and B occur.
H3 (b): If the return distribution of bank projects is not known, but the network
structure of banks is, an information-based bank run at bank A causes a
panic-based bank run at bank B.
Table 1.1: Experimental hypotheses.
Possible spillover effects with respect to bank C are expected to be of mere psycho-
logical nature. We now proceed to the description of the experiment.
1.3 Experimental design
Based on our hypotheses presented in Section 1.2, we design our experiment with
three treatments. This experiment is a between-subjects design, i.e., each subject
only participates in one treatment.
In treatment 1, we randomly assign subjects to groups of six. Within each group,
subjects act as depositors within a simple network structure of three symmetric
banks A, B, and C. All banks are framed to be independent, i.e., to have no economic
linkages between each other. At each bank, each subject has an account at his
disposal which is endowed with 1000 ECU1. This endowment is a non-accrual loan
that has to be paid back at the end of the experiment. Endowing subjects with
a given amount deposited on each bank account reduces the probability that they
might invest only a small fraction of their available funds into banks at the beginning
of the experiment, while waiting and earning the show-up-fee of 20 CHF without
risk. We try to make subjects actively participating in the experiment from the
beginning and thinking about their actions. Each subject also has a cash account
with an initial balance of 0 ECU.
There is a maximum of 20 periods. In each period, each bank offers a fixed
interest rate of 5% on deposits. These interest expenditures are financed by means
of investment into a profitable one-period project. At the end of each period except
the last, each bank invests total deposits into this project, which can be of either
good or bad quality with probability q and 1− q, respectively. q is equal to 0.5 and
known to the subjects. Good-quality projects yield a return of 15% and bad-quality
1Experimental currency units.
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projects yield a return of -5%, which is common knowledge. The expected return
thus equals the offered interest rate on deposits. There are no interests on cash
holdings.
Each bank has a different path of realized project returns (see Figure 1.1). The
depicted bank trajectories are drawn from the population of trajectories based on
independent and identically distributed bank project returns. This pre-selection of
bank trajectories is motivated by the necessity to be able to compare banks across
groups and treatments. Subjects are informed that a bank’s project returns can
increase or decrease with given probability q and 1 − q, respectively. The pre-
selection of trajectories does not invalidate this information, as it is still true that
trajectories were randomly formed in the first place. Figure 1.1 shows that bank
A experiences a sequence of negative project returns for the first five consecutive
periods, exemplifying a deteriorating economic situation. From period 6 onwards,
bank A’s project returns revert to a positive trend. Bank B starts with a rather
good economic situation. However, from the recovery point of bank A, bank B
follows the same downward development which bank A has experienced just before.
From period 11 onwards, bank B’s project returns also revert to a positive trend.
Meanwhile, bank C follows a balanced path throughout the experiment. The figure
also shows the theoretical development of deposits for any subject in complete
absence of portfolio adjustments.
If subjects would keep their initial portfolio of 1000 ECU at each bank un-
changed throughout the experiment, they would maximize their earnings and all
banks would be fully able to pay out deposits plus interest income. However, this
only serves as a theoretical guideline as subjects are unaware of this fact. The bank
trajectories are constructed in such a way that the liquidity levels of all banks at the
end of period 20 are identical and slightly larger than total deposits plus compound
interest payments.
From the subject’s perspective, each period is divided into two stages. In stage
1, subjects see an overview of their current deposits at each bank as well as their
current cash holdings. For each bank, they also see a graph displaying the path of
past net profits, which are defined as assets2 minus deposits and compound interest
rates. Current net profits are displayed as a number below each graph (see the
respective screenshot in Appendix 1.7.2). Subjects then make their withdrawal
decisions simultaneously, and any withdrawals are added to their cash account. If
total withdrawal requests exceed current liquidity at any bank, a bank run occurs.
2Assets consist of deposits plus compound project returns. The terms assets and liquidity are
used synonymously.
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Figure 1.1: Bank trajectories and theoretical development of deposits over time.
Displayed is each bank’s trajectory of realized gross project returns as well as the
theoretical path of deposit development for any given subject in the case of an
unchanged initial deposit portfolio. For each path, the starting point is 1000 ECU,
i.e., the initial deposit of any given subject at any given bank in period 1.
The bank is then liquidated3 and each subject within the affected group receives
the share of liquidity available that is equal to the share of his deposits relative to
total deposits. If all three banks are liquidated, the experiment ends. In stage 2,
updated information regarding bank balances, cash holdings, and bank performance
is provided. The subjects may then use their cash holdings to re-invest into any
bank until period 19. As the experiment ends after period 20 by the latest and
banks do not invest into any more projects thereafter, there is also no further stage
2 for the subjects in the last round.
Treatment 2 only distinguishes itself from treatment 1 in that subjects do not
know the return distribution of the banks’ investment projects. Likewise, treatment
3 only distinguishes itself from treatment 2 in that bank A is said to have an
economic link to bank B. This economic linkage between bank A and bank B is a
framing effect, i.e., its nature is not explained in more detail in order to decrease
information complexity for study participants. However, given the form of their
return paths as shown in Figure 1.1, bank A and bank B can either be considered
3Note that this design feature does not allow us to conduct an analysis as performed in the
paper by Chakravarty, Fonseca, and Kaplan [2014], where the persistence of bank runs within
one bank over time can be analyzed due to their experimental structure of a repeated one-shot
coordination game. However, our design as described before allows for a larger degree of realism.
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as associated banks, where bank B’s trajectory mirrors the one of bank A with a
certain time lag (rather than immediately) and, thus, a decrease in returns of bank
B can be interpreted as being fundamentals-based, or one can interpret them to
show a mere happenstance correlation of project returns, which allows for relatively
large flexibility in the interpretation of our design. The framing in treatment 3 then
provides meaning to the return paths as they evolve for the subjects to see over time.
In this sense, information given about the return distribution of bank projects as
well as about economic connectivity can be both economically and psychologically
meaningful.
At the end of each treatment, subjects are asked to fill in a questionnaire which is
designed to collect data on socio-economic factors (i.e., gender, age, nationality, field
of studies, and monthly disposable income), and furthermore to identify the degree
of trust, risk aversion, ambiguity, social preferences, time preferences, loss aversion,
and beliefs about the probabilities of a bank run.4 For a detailed description of
these variables, see Appendix 1.7.1.
The subject’s earnings are composed of a show-up-fee of 20 CHF, the com-
pound interest on deposits, and any earnings made from the sequence of lotteries
as presented in the questionnaire. The exchange rate between ECU and CHF is set
to 250:1, i.e., for each 250 ECU (or parts of it) earned, the subject receives (the
respective proportion of) 1 CHF in cash. Applying this rate generates an upper
bound of 18.32 CHF for the bank run experiment and expected lottery earnings of
0.40 CHF. Total earnings are subject to a lower bound of 10 CHF to ensure that
subjects who might conclude the experiment with a particularly low amount are
not disappointed and therefore will return to participate in future experiments.
1.4 Behavioral predictions
Our two treatment variables are the knowledge of the return probabilities of bank
projects, 1q, and the knowledge of economic linkages (or the network structure)
between banks, 1n, where 1 is the respective indicator function of q and n. While
1q is indicative of the occurrence of bank runs, 1n is indicative of their spread
through the network. In general, we expect bank runs to be more likely to arise
if subjects are unaware of the underlying return distribution of bank projects (i.e.,
1q = 0), and more likely to spread if the network structure is known (i.e., 1n = 1).
4As in Chakravarty, Fonseca, and Kaplan [2014] and Duffy, Karadimitropoulou, and Parravano
[2016], we do not directly measure subjects’ beliefs about bank solvency or other depositors’
likelihood to withdraw funds explicitly. However, we can interpret individual withdrawals as a
proxy for a subject’s subjective probability that the bank from which he withdraws funds is about
to become insolvent. This relates to the channel that beliefs about a bank’s solvency are one
out of two possible mechanisms for triggering bank runs, as proposed by Chari and Jagannathan
[1988].
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This leads us to a 2×2 design which is depicted in Table 1.2. In this paper, we look
at three different treatments which we can categorize with respect to the amount
of information given to subjects.
q known
No Yes
n known
No
treatment 2 treatment 1
(bank run, no spread) (no bank run, no spread)
Yes
treatment 3
(bank run, spread)
Table 1.2: Overview of the experimental 2× 2 design.
Displayed are our three treatments based on the 2× 2 design, resulting from the
intersection of the knowledge about a bank’s project return probability, q, and the
network structure, n. Expectations about the occurrence and spread of bank runs
are indicated in parentheses. The intersection where both q and n are know, i.e.,
the theoretical combination of bank runs spreading after no bank run has occurred
before, is not meaningful in practice and is thus not studied any further.
In treatment 1, relating to our hypothesis H1, subjects have medium information
(type 1). They know that each bank’s project realizes good and bad outcomes
with equal probabilities, and should thus anticipate that even after a sequence of
negative returns, every path still has a 50% chance of trending upwards again in
the subsequent period. Therefore, it is not rational to run at any point in time. All
subjects should decide to trust the banking system and to keep their initial deposits
unchanged for the entire duration of the experiment. This way, each subject would
maximize his payoff from compound interests on deposits as shown in Figure 1.1.
Furthermore, subjects are given the framing that banks do not feature economic
linkages. Hence, even in the case that a bank run would occur at any bank, it
should at least not spread through the network. This treatment serves as our
control treatment.
In treatment 2, relating to our hypothesis H2, subjects have minimum informa-
tion. The probability distribution of project returns is not disclosed. Risk is thus
replaced by ambiguity, which is a key element of our design for the occurrence of
bank runs. Note that by doing so, we are able to implement a fairly elegant solu-
tion in the sense that we do not have to alter the paths used for any bank, which
allows for more experimental control and avoids undesirable treatment effects. We
conjecture a negative relation between the project’s probability of success, q, and
the bank’s probability of default, p, where p depends on the subjects’ withdrawal
behavior over time and is thus endogenous. Therefore, the risk of default of any
bank should now increase with the number of successive negative project returns.
Based on the sequence of negative project returns for bank A between period 1 and
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6 (see Figure 1.1), we expect to observe a bank run on bank A around period 6
with subjects redistributing their deposits to either the better performing banks B
and C or to their cash account. With bank B engaging into a series of negative
project returns between periods 6 and 11, we furthermore expect to observe a bank
run on bank B. Basically, the timing of this second bank run is informative about
the subjects’ motivation for withdrawing their funds. If the run on bank B occurs
around period 7, then we can characterize it as a panic-based bank run. At this
state, there is no need to run from bank B since it only just entered into a period of
bad project outcomes. However, if bank A collapses and subjects start panicking,
then they might interpret a negative return at bank B as a sign for an imminent
bank run. If the run on bank B occurs around period 11, however, then we can
interpret it as an information-based bank run. In this case, funds are withdrawn
based on the history of negative projects returns and redistributed to the remaining
bank C or to the cash account. In this sense, a run on bank A around period 6
would also have to be characterized as information-based, whereas an earlier run
would be labeled panic-based. However, since subjects do not know the network
structure in this treatment, any observed downstream bank runs should theoreti-
cally be of information-based nature as spreads along the lines of economic linkages
should not be observed.
Finally, in treatment 3, relating to our hypothesis H3, subjects have medium
information (type 2). Knowledge about the underlying network structure is now
added to their set of information. Hence, the considerations regarding the spread
of bank runs through the financial network made in the previous paragraph should
now be confirmed by the data: We expect to see bank runs at bank A, followed by
contagion leading to bank runs at bank B.
To summarize, our general prediction is that the probability of a bank run is
smallest in treatment 1 due to the considerations made above. While the probability
of a bank run is assumed to be larger in both treatments 2 and 3, there is no ex
ante conjecture about the relation of their magnitudes. Note that as a rational
benchmark, there should be no Bayesian updating at work in this experiment.
According to Bayes’ theorem,
P (X|Y ) = P (Y |X) · P (X)
P (Y )
,
where P (X) is the prior belief about X and P (X|Y ) is the posterior belief about
X after having observed Y . Let X be the event where the profitable project has a
positive return and let Y be the event where it has a negative return, i.e., P (X) =
P (up) and P (Y ) = P (down). In the control treatment, we have P (up) = q = 0.5
and P (down) = 1− q = 0.5. In treatments 2 and 3, q is unknown, but a reasonable
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heuristic is q = 0.5, which is in fact its true value. Inserting these values into Bayes’
theorem, this yields
P (up | down) = P (down | up) · P (up)
P (down)
,
where P (down | up) = 0.5. Obviously, we then have P (up | down) = 0.5 = P (up),
as well. As each trajectory is created as a random sequence of positive and negative
returns with equal probabilities, the probability of positive (or negative) returns in
any period is independent from previous realizations. Hence, prior and posterior
beliefs about the probability of good and bad projects should be equal in theory.
1.5 Results
The experiment was programmed using the experimental software z-Tree, the Zurich
toolbox for ready-made economic experiments developed by Fischbacher [2007].5
Subjects were recruited via the University Registration Center for Study Partici-
pants of the University of Zurich on condition that they had participated in a lab-
oratory experiment at least once before and that they understand German. This is
to ensure that subjects are familiar with the organizational procedures, understand
the instructions, and therefore are unlikely to cause delays on the day of the exper-
iment. 12 sessions with a total of 180 subjects were conducted in the Laboratory
for Experimental and Behavioral Economics at the Department of Economics at
the University of Zurich in May 2016. On average, each session lasted for one hour
in which subjects earned 29.10 CHF, including a show-up fee of 20 CHF. The ex-
periment was conducted in German. Detailed written instructions were distributed
to the subjects before the start of the experiment (see Appendix 1.7.2). To ensure
that each subject understood the upcoming procedures, a set of control questions
was distributed which all subjects had to answer correctly (see Appendix 1.7.3).
Any remaining open issues were explained by the experimenter.
Out of 180 subjects, 39% are male, 69% from Switzerland, and 37% report a
monthly disposable income of up to 500 CHF, where the overall income distribution
is right-skewed as it is typical for this type of subject pool. The average age is 23.8
years. Table 1.3 shows the distribution of reported fields of studies. Note that we
decide not to exclude economics students from our experiment in order to generate
a realistic cross-section of individual backgrounds in our data.
Each treatment was conducted with 60 subjects randomly distributed across 10
groups of 6 depositors each.
While Figure 1.2 shows the total number of bank runs observed at each bank
5The code is available upon request.
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Field of studies
Arts, humanities, and political sciences 13%
Computer sciences 4%
Engineering and architecture 11%
Law 8%
Mechanical and electrical engineering 7%
Mathematics 2%
Medical sciences 8%
Natural sciences 32%
Economics 6%
Other/not specified 9%
Table 1.3: Overview of the participants’ reported fields of studies.
Displayed is the percentage of subjects reporting a given field of studies.
across treatments, Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of bank runs over time and
across treatments.
Figure 1.2 is informative regarding the hypotheses whether or not bank runs
should occur across the different treatments in the first place. Hypothesis H1 has
to be rejected for both banks A and B, but is plausible for bank C: If only the bank’s
return distribution is known to subjects, bank runs do occur at those banks with
a distinctive period of poor performance, i.e., at banks A and B, but not at banks
which seem to perform relatively stable over time, as bank C does. Hence, subjects
seem to react to sequences of bad performance that are visually presented more than
to written information about the bank’s fundamentals. Both hypothesis H2 (a) and
H3 (a) seem plausible: If the bank’s return distribution is not known to subjects,
bank runs do occur at all banks. This is independent of the knowledge about
economic linkages among banks. Moreover, we observe that in each treatment,
bank runs at bank A are most frequent. Given our bank trajectories as depicted
in Figure 1.1, subjects are probably most nervous about a possible run at bank A
given its straightforward decline in assets from the beginning of the experiment.
In contrast, at the time bank B experiences a sequence of negative returns, it has
already accumulated a good balance. Hence, runs may be relatively less frequent
as depositors may be less nervous about poor performance.
Figure 1.3 provides some primary information regarding the contagiousness of
bank runs across banks over time. Hypothesis H2 (b) seems plausible: If neither the
bank’s return distribution nor the network structure among banks is known, there
is no observational evidence for spreading bank runs in, as an average of 5 periods
elapses between a run on bank A and a run on bank B. The time span leading up
to a run on bank B can be interpreted as the time necessary for subjects to decide
how to react to developments at bank B itself rather than to past events at bank A,
as it is precisely five periods of consecutive poor performance that occur at bank B.
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Figure 1.2: Total number of bank runs observed at each bank across treatments.
Displayed is the total number of bank runs observed for each bank in each
treatment, with the respective treatment’s expectations about the occurrence and
spread of bank runs stated in parentheses.
A contagious bank run is expected to happen sooner. Hypothesis H3 (b) does not
seem plausible: The knowledge about network connections does not seem to foster
contagion within the system, but rather induce the opposite: Here, an average of
9.5 periods elapses between any run on bank A and bank B, that is, more rather
than fewer periods pass between any two runs. However, a caveat is in order at
this point: The number of observations of successive bank runs in treatments 2 and
3 is very small, with only one respectively two observations available in the data.
The impression of a plethora of bank runs as created by Figure 1.2 is due to the
fact that many bank runs occurred in singularity within any group, or that a run
on bank A was following rather than preceding a run on bank B.
There may be a last-round effect present for bank C where most funds are
accumulated by the end of the experiment when subjects might want to secure
funds on their cash account, which we study in more detail in the panel analysis
at the end of this section. An alternative explanation for late bank runs at bank
C could be provided by Duffy, Karadimitropoulou, and Parravano [2016]’s finding
that the timing of a downstream bank run is contingent on the concerned bank’s
proximity to the bank who suffered the initial liquidity shock in the financial system.
As bank C is modeled to be independent from banks A and B, this reasoning could
apply, as well.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the number of bank runs over time and treatments.
The respective treatment’s expectations about the occurrence and spread of bank
runs stated in parentheses.
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The combination of results regarding our three hypotheses reveals, however,
that there are no distinct treatment effects to be observed. Hence, in contrast to
our initial hypotheses, each treatment features non-spreading bank runs. There are
two potential reasons for missing treatment effects in the occurrence and spread of
bank runs. Firstly, the number of observations relative to the number of groups
is rather small. Re-running the experiment on a larger scale could lead to further
insights in this matter. And secondly, the treatment effect is only designed as a
frame within the written instructions. As such, subjects might neglect the detail of
information about the bank’s fundamentals given therein, and instead have focused
on new information presented about net profits in each period. The salience of
treatments thus could have been stronger. In particular, the distinction between
treatments 1 and 2 was the knowledge about the bank’s return distribution. If this
was unknown as in treatment 2, a sensible benchmark would be to assume q = 0.5,
which is indeed the true value of q. Hence, it is sensible to assume treatments 1
and 2 to be equal. Similarly, assuming q = 0.5 and neglecting the information
given about network structures in the instructions for treatments 2 and 3, it is
furthermore possible to assume these treatments to be equal, as well.
Based on these considerations, and after an in-depth descriptive analysis on po-
tential variations across treatments, we find that the data is extremely homogenous.
Therefore, we decide not to conduct any further analyses separately by treatment,
but rather to pool the data from all treatments. We now divert our focus toward
a unified analysis of withdrawal and depositing behavior and aim at identifying
their determinants, which seem to be independent of the information given about
fundamentals and/or network connections.
We conduct a unified panel analysis with fixed effects and use two sets of panel
regressions with new deposits, D, and withdrawals, W , as the dependent variables,
respectively, which also allows us to better discriminate between actual and quasi
bank runs, where the latter describes situations in which total requested with-
drawals are very close to assets available at the respective bank. Using withdrawals
and new deposits instead of a binary variable indicating the occurrence of a bank
run also increases the robustness of our results as we have a total of 180 observa-
tions. Our panels are balanced by construction.
We analyze the following specifications of panel regressions:
Djit = αi + βjpi
j
t + κjfearit + θkrun
k
t + ηt20 + εit (1.1)
and
W jit = αi + βjpi
j
t + κjfearit + θkrun
k
t−1 + ηt20 + εit, (1.2)
where j ∈ {A,B,C} and
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k =

B if j = A,
A if j = B,
A,B if j = C.
Bank assets are given by the sum of deposits plus revenues from projects, and
net profits shown to the subjects are determined by the difference between assets
and the sum of deposits. Hence, assets are redundant and deposits cancel out.
We therefore refrain from including either assets or the sum of deposits into the
regression in order to avoid issues of multi-collinearity.
Table 1.4 defines and summarizes the variables used in panels 1.1 and 1.2.
Variable Definition
Djit new deposits made by a subject
W jit withdrawals made by a subject
pijt net profits of bank
fearit dummy variable indicating whether a subject was worried that one or more banks
would become bankrupt (see Appendix 1.7.1), with fearit = 1 if the subject was
worried about this
runkt dummy variable indicating a bank run, with run
k
t = 1 if a bank run occurred
runkt−1 dummy variable indicating a bank run, with run
k
t−1 = 1 if a bank run occurred
in the previous period
t20 dummy variable indicating the last period, with t20 = 1 in period 20
Table 1.4: Definition of variables used in panels 1.1 and 1.2.
Index i refers to the subject (with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 180}), t to the period (with t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 20}),
and j and k to the bank (with j ∈ {A,B,C} and k ∈ {A,B}).
Note that due to the time scale of events with respect to withdrawals, possible
bank runs, and new deposits, panel 1.1 includes runkt as a variable, while panel 1.2
includes its one-period time lag. For j = k, runkt is omitted in each panel with
Djit or W
j
it as dependent variable for trivial reasons: A run on bank j causes its
liquidation, hence no further deposits or withdrawals are possible – hence there is
no effect to study. The effect of a run on bank C is hardly observed, and hence not
studied.
Subject-specific and hence time-invariant characteristics such as socio-economic
status are not included in the panel for reasons of multi-collinearity. Any variation
in this respect is covered through fixed effects by αi.
The results for our panel regressions with new deposits and withdrawals at banks
A, B, and C as dependent variables are reported in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, respectively,
with columns 1, 2, and 3 showing coefficients, clustered standard errors, and levels of
significance for all respective variables. We now proceed to interpret the significant
coefficients’ signs and magnitudes in order to grasp the overall structure underlying
the data.
In Table 1.5, we see that there is a highly significant positive relation between
27
DAit D
B
it D
C
it
piAt 0.0199** −0.0338*** −0.0473***
(0.0095) (0.0117) (0.0122)
piBt −0.0183* 0.0454*** −0.0575***
(0.0105) (0.0056) (0.0071)
piCt −0.0772*** −0.0786*** 0.0676***
(0.0200) (0.0166) (0.0109)
fearit −125.7206 *** −46.4367* −15.6870
(33.7814) (24.9356) (50.1106)
runAt 83.9980*** 170.2416***
(29.0827) (21.3861)
runBt 329.9774* 177.6720***
(171.0208) (61.5187)
t20 −365.9074 *** −208.1506 *** −248.8644 ***
(81.6162) (41.2396) (28.2088)
constant 116.3138*** 115.5748*** 90.3945***
(14.8413) (17.1810) (17.7956)
within R2 0.0714 0.0473 0.0565
n 180 180 180
T 20 20 20
Table 1.5: Fixed-effects panel regression results for new deposits at each bank as
dependent variable.
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% level. Clustered standard errors are
given in parenthesis.
net profits and new deposits at any bank j: The larger net profits at any bank,
the larger new deposits at the respective institution. The magnitude of this effect
ranges from 20 ECU at bank A to 68 ECU at bank C for each additional 1000 ECU
in net profits. Looking at cross-bank effects, we find that an increase in net profits
at any bank k 6= j decreases new deposits at bank j. Again, the magnitude of this
effect ranges from a decrease in new deposits at bank A by 18 ECU if net profits at
bank B increase by 1000 ECU to a decrease in new deposits at bank B by 79 ECU if
net profits at bank C increase by 1000 ECU. Thus, good performance at any bank
causes people to slightly shift their funds from other banks to the well-performing
bank, which supports rational behavior.
All coefficients of runjt are positive and significant. A run on bank A causes new
deposits to increase by 84 ECU at bank B and by 170 ECU at bank C. Similarly, a
run on bank B causes new deposits to increase by 330 ECU at bank A and by 178
ECU at bank C. This is equivalent to saying that any run on a bank with a defined
period of poor performance causes people to increase their deposits at other banks.
However, in order to fully evaluate this cross-effect with respect to the spread of
bank runs through the system, we need to consider the results of Table 1.6 in the
following.
If subjects experience fear of an imminent bank run, new deposits significantly
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WAit W
B
it W
C
it
piAt 0.0544** −0.0631** −0.0137
(0.0218) (0.0241) (0.0241)
piBt −0.0032 −0.0327*** −0.0006
(0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0079)
piCt −0.0296** 0.0484*** −0.1665***
(0.0113) (0.0134) (0.0175)
fearit 157.4749 −40.7515 3.2999
(106.7036) (36.3015) (76.8981)
runAt−1 247.9107*** 4.8969
(67.0356) (50.7213)
runBt−1 296.3202** 134.5103
(139.9333) (101.5149)
t20 222.1396 260.5101** −304.9196 ***
(153.8726) (106.1226) (62.6673)
constant 229.9988*** 41.8047 160.0316***
(40.6963) (42.9036) (42.7047)
within R2 0.0446 0.0409 0.0897
n 180 180 180
T 20 20 20
Table 1.6: Fixed-effects panel regression results for withdrawals at each bank as
dependent variable.
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% level. Clustered standard errors are
given in parenthesis.
decrease at banks A and B (by order of magnitude of -126 ECU and -46 ECU,
respectively). Hence, banks with a troubled history of net profits are more likely
to face a decline in their assets than do relatively stable banks (bank C in this
setting).
Finally, we find evidence for a last-round effect at all three banks between 208
ECU (bank B) and 366 ECU (bank A) on average.
Table 1.6 shows regression results for withdrawals at any bank, which may be
interpreted as subjective probabilities of a bank run to occur, as discussed in Section
1.3. In unison with the results for new deposits, we find that an increase in net
profits at banks B and C by 1000 ECU decreases withdrawals from these banks by
33 ECU and 167 ECU, respectively. However, we find the opposite effect for bank
A: Here, an increase in net profits by 1000 ECU tends to increase withdrawals by
54 ECU on average. Similarly, the pattern observed for any cross-effects is both less
clear and less strong than for new deposits. If bank C performs better, withdrawals
from bank A slightly decrease and withdrawals from bank B slightly increase; if
bank A performs better, withdrawals from bank B slightly decrease. These effects
remain unexplained.
Withdrawals from both banks A and B strongly react to a bank run that oc-
curred at the respective other bank in the previous period. A run on bank A in
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t − 1 causes withdrawals to increase at bank B by 248 ECU on average; a run on
bank B in t− 1 causes withdrawals to increase at bank A by 296 ECU on average.
These results support our hypotheses H2 (b) and H3 (b), namely, that a run on any
bank does provoke actions to withdraw funds from other banks. Combining these
findings with those from Table 1.5, we see that the net withdrawal effect over any
two successive periods, where net withdrawals are defined as Wt−Dt−1, is positive
for bank A and negative for bank B, i.e., a run on bank B effectively decreases
net withdrawals from bank A, whereas a run on bank A effectively increases net
withdrawals from bank B. This means that a run on bank A has in fact a negative
overall impact on deposits at bank B. This is evidence for a bank run at bank A
causing bank B’s assets to decrease in the subsequent period.
Unlike its effect on new deposits, the fear of an imminent bank run does not
seem to have any effect on withdrawals themselves.
We observe last-round effects at banks B and C, with 261 ECU withdrawn from
bank B and a decrease in withdrawals of 305 ECU at bank C in period 20. This
indicates the action of shifting funds from bank B to the stable bank C, which
may be regarded as a safe harbor for funds, at the end of the experiment. In this
context, we also observe that subjects tend to keep a certain fraction of their wealth
on their cash account throughout the experiment. The hypothesis of H0: ∆Ct = 0,
where ∆Ct is defined as the difference between cash holdings at the end and at
the beginning of each period, is rejected against the right-sided alternative at the
1%-level of significance (p-value equal to 0.0000). The magnitude of this variable
increases with the occurrence of bank runs. Hence, there is mild evidence for a
flight into cash in the face of troubled banks and possible runs.
The percentage of variation explained within subjects lies between approxi-
mately 4% and 9% for the two panels and is thus rather small, which can be
attributed to the analysis of micro-data.
As a robustness check and for statistical control, we expand each panel regression
by the inclusion of one individual time lag pijt−l out of a set of five different time
lags, where l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}. We find that the effect of a bank run at banks A or B
on new deposits at bank C remains significant for all lags l. Similarly, their effect
on withdrawals from bank C remains insignificant throughout. Including up to four
time lags of pijt−l (with the exception of pi
j
t−1) keeps the effect of a bank run on bank
B on changes in new deposits at bank A significant. A similar finding applies for
withdrawals from bank A with up to three time lags keeping the effect significant.
However, including any lags of net profit turns the effect of a bank run on bank A
on new deposits at bank B insignificant. Only one time lag keeps significance for
the respective effect on withdrawals. In conclusion, adding recent lags of net profits
keeps our results relatively stable.
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1.6 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we suggest a novel dynamic approach to study the occurrence and
contagion of silent bank runs within an incomplete network of financial institu-
tions in an experimental setting. We aim to contribute to the recent literature on
bank run contagion by addressing a number of issues of previously used theoreti-
cal models, which we regard as noteworthy, through an explorative experimental
design.
Based on our observations in the experiment, we can draw the following con-
clusions: When making depositing and withdrawal decisions, bank depositors do
not seem to take into consideration objective, written information about a bank’s
situation, be it about the investment situation of the bank itself or its economic
linkages to other banks. Hence, such information does not seem to be able to
prevent bank runs. Instead, visually experienced information about current and
previous net profits generated by the bank seems to matter more. We find a pos-
itive causal relation between net profits and new deposits at any given bank, and
a negative relation with respect to new deposits at other banks. Overall, a recent
run on a bank with a history of poor performance tends to decrease assets at other
banks through increased withdrawals, thereby indicating a tendency for bank runs
to create contagious effects through incomplete financial networks, even though the
actual occurrence of bank runs does not spread itself. The fear of an imminent
bank run also has a negative effect on withdrawal behavior. Healthy banks with
relatively stable past performance are not affected by these factors overall. In this
respect, regulators might want to think about what kind of bank information is
disclosed to the public, and in which way this is communicated and presented.
Both Brown, Trautmann, and Vlahu [2016] and Chakravarty, Fonseca, and Ka-
plan [2014] build their experiments based on (a modified version of) the two-person
coordination game as suggested by Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. While these studies
use different variables to model economic linkages (namely, the bank’s asset qual-
ity and its liquidation value, respectively), the underlying mechanism is the same:
The respective variable is identical across banks in treatments with economic link-
ages, whereas missing economic linkages are realized through independent payoff
schemes. This meaning of economic linkages (or the missing thereof) is commu-
nicated to subjects in the respective treatments. Building their design upon the
model by Allen and Gale [2000], Duffy, Karadimitropoulou, and Parravano [2016]
model economic linkages between two banks as either mutual or unilateral invest-
ments of one bank’s deposits into another bank. In this sense, previous studies
realized economic linkages either by means of identical bank fundamentals or by
active depositing behavior of banks. In our paper, bank connections are imple-
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mented through trajectories of bank project returns, based on which banks may be
flexibly interpreted as being linked or independent depending on the framing given
in the respective instructions of a treatment. The framing thus provides meaning
to the individual return paths. While offering an alternative way to create bank
connections in the laboratory with our paper, we suggest that framing shall be
made stronger and more salient in future studies.
Regarding the payout scheme in case of a bank run, both subjects in the two-
person coordination game in the study by Brown, Trautmann, and Vlahu [2016]
receive half of the liquidation value of their bank. In the equivalent situation in
Chakravarty, Fonseca, and Kaplan [2014]’s ten-person setup, subjects are paid ex-
pected payoffs. In the paper by Duffy, Karadimitropoulou, and Parravano [2016],
the payout upon the occurrence of a bank run is an equal share of bank assets
for each withdrawing party. There is no direct sequential service constraint imple-
mented. Hence, all three studies rely on a proportionate payout scheme in case of
a bank run where all subjects involved decide to withdraw their funds in a given
period. However, if the bank faces liquidation even with a smaller number of sub-
jects requesting their funds, those who did not decide to withdraw at the same
point in time obtain a payout of zero. This stands in contrast to our paper where
proportionate payments in case of a bank run are made for all active depositors,
irrespective of their participation in the bank run. Note that despite this circum-
stance, subjects still have an incentive to withdraw funds from their bank, as their
withdrawal may be large enough to secure funds without triggering a bank run
yet, given other subjects keep their deposits at that time. This design element in
our paper may be regarded as an indirect deposit insurance scheme as previously
studied in the literature on individual bank runs. We leave it to future research to
further investigate the effect of indirect deposit insurance in banking networks.
Finally, one can discuss the rational behavior of subjects in treatment 1. We
argue that agents should not run in this scenario, as they are aware of equal proba-
bilities of good and bad bank projects. Therefore, in case of a succession of negative
returns, they should be able to anticipate a trend reversion in the future and keep
their deposits unchanged. One may discuss, however, that subjects update their
beliefs in each period such that they expect a bank run to be more likely with each
new negative return realization, especially since withdrawals do not entail transac-
tion costs. While these different perspectives cannot be aligned easily at this point,
we argue that given the construction of the trajectories of bank returns, a run in
treatment 1 should not be rational. Subjects are assumed to be able to infer that
keeping their deposits is the best long-run strategy. To further address this issue,
we suggest running a complementary treatment where beliefs about changes in the
probability of a bank run are elicited in each period and compared with project
return probabilities.
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Future research may focus on extending the current data set and check for
original treatment effects. As an additional robustness check, one may include a
treatment where withdrawals from banks are organized in a sequential instead of
simultaneous manner within each group. In this respect, it would be possible to
study the traditional “first come, first served” logic in a dynamic setting. Be-
sides, a proportionate payout of bank assets in case of a bank run could be granted
only to subjects involved in the current withdrawal process, for instance. It would
furthermore be of interest to extend our modeling of financial linkages toward an
incorporation of actual financial interaction between different banks. Such an ad-
ditional treatment would allow for a robustness check regarding the impact of the
presentation of information about economic linkages between banks on withdrawal
behavior. Finally, one may consider a follow-up experiment on subjective awareness
about network structures in which the determinants of network awareness would
be analyzed and an economically desirable degree of awareness determined. In this
respect, it would be possible to analyze the severity of the framing effect in this
paper.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Description of questionnaire variables
Trust is measured based on three questions of the German Socio-Economic Panel
study (SOEP) youth questionnaire 2015 (Goebel, Kroh, Schro¨der, and Schupp
[2015]), namely one, “One can trust people.”, two, “In these times one can’t rely
on anybody else.”, and three, “When dealing with strangers it is better to be cau-
tious.” For each question, subjects are asked to assess their perceived level of trust
on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates complete disagreement and 5 indicates
complete agreement. Note that the uneven number of items in this and the follow-
ing questions ensures that truly neutral subjects do not have to choose an option
that does not adequately reflect their individual perception. We assume subjects
to evaluate items as equally spaced.
Risk aversion and ambiguity are measured based on a question of the SOEP
youth questionnaire 2015 (Goebel, Kroh, Schro¨der, and Schupp [2015]) namely,
“Generally speaking, how willing or unwilling are you to take risks?”. Subjects are
asked to indicate their level of risk aversion on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates
complete risk aversion and 5 indicates complete risk seeking.
Social preferences are elicited through the question, “Generally speaking, how
willing or unwilling are you to help others without expecting anything in return?”.
Again, subjects are asked to indicate their answer on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1
indicating complete unwillingness and 5 indicating complete willingness.
Time preferences are measured by the question “Are you generally an impatient
person or someone who always shows great patience?”. Again, subjects are asked
to indicate their personal view on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates complete
impatience and 5 indicates complete patience.
As to the determination of loss aversion, we use a modification of the approach
suggested by Fehr and Goette [2007] which was first implemented by Brune [2011].
Each subject is presented with a sequence of five lotteries and has to decide for each
of them whether to accept or to reject it. Each lottery is of type (100, 0.5; υ, 0.5),
where υ ∈ {−20,−40, . . . ,−100} ECU. Accepting a lottery triggers its realization
and the respective amount is added to the earnings from the experiment, which is
communicated to the subjects on the computer screen. Rejecting a lottery yields
a payoff of 0 ECU. The threshold where each subject decides to move from the
lottery to the safe option is then used to construct a measure of loss aversion, l, as
the percentage of denied lotteries, i.e.,
l = 1−
(
1
5
5∑
k=1
1L,k
)
,
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where 1L,k is the indicator function of lotteries accepted in stage k. A larger value
of l indicates a larger degree of loss aversion.
Beliefs about the probabilities of a bank run are determined by three questions,
namely one, “During today’s study, were you worried that one or more banks might
become bankrupt?”, two, “Can you remember in which round you were worried that
one or more banks might become bankrupt?”, and three, “Did you withdraw money
from one of your bank accounts because you were worried that one or more banks
might become bankrupt?”. While questions 1 and 3 have to be answered with yes or
no, the answer to question 2 requires the indication of at least one period between
1 and 20, or can be answered with no.
1.7.2 Instructions for all treatments6
Note that the ultimate purpose of this experiment is explicitly not mentioned in any
of the following instructions. This is in order to prevent subjects from generating
an experimenter demand effect.
General instructions for study participants
Welcome to and thank you for participating in today’s study. The study will take
approximately 90 minutes.
In this study you can earn money. The amount that you will earn depends on
your decisions and on the decisions of the other study participants. All earnings
that you will make in this study will be shown to you in Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) first, where the following conversion between ECU and CHF applies:
250 ECU = 1 CHF
resp.
100 ECU = 0.40 CHF
At the end of today’s study, all earnings that you will have made will be con-
verted into CHF using the above conversion rate and paid to you in cash, including
a participation fee of 20 CHF.
In order to earn money in this study, it is very important that you read the
following instructions carefully.
During the study, you are not allowed to talk to other participants or
use electronic devices. Non-observance of this rule will lead to exclusion from
this study and all payments.
6These as well as all following instructions are written along the lines of the instructions used
in Brune [2011]. The instructions distributed to the subjects were written in German. Differences
between treatments 1, 2 and 3 are indicated by footnotes on page 37.
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On the following pages, the course of this study will be described in detail.
Please read this description carefully. On a supplementary sheet you will find a
number of comprehension questions. Please answer these questions and raise your
hand afterward. We will then come to your seat to check your answers and set-
tle any remaining questions. As soon as the answers of all participants have been
checked and there are no further questions, please wait until the study begins.
Description of the study
Today’s study consists of maximally 20 rounds. All study participants will be
randomly distributed into groups of six people each. You are a bank customer
within one such group of six and you can deposit money at three banks A, B, and
C.
You have a cash account as well as one account each at the three banks A, B,
and C. At the beginning of round 1, the balance of your cash account is 0 ECU. The
balance of each of your accounts at the three banks A, B, and C is 1000 ECU, hence
3000 ECU in total. These balances are to be understood as non-accrual loans. You
will receive interests on your bank account balances and these will be your earnings
from this study. At the end of this study, your final balance will be calculated which
consists of your cash account as well as your bank account balances. The initial
balance of 3000 ECU will be subtracted from your final balance. The remaining
amount represents your earnings from this study. Should you have incurred losses
during the study, that is, should your earnings be negative, then the difference will
be subtracted from your participation fee. However, your final earnings from this
study will be at least 10 CHF.
In each round, you can change your share of deposits over your three bank
accounts as well as over your cash account in each round. At the end of each
round, you will receive a fixed interest of 5% on your account balance at each
bank. You will receive no interests on your cash account balance.
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Example on how to calculate your earnings
• initial balance = 3000 ECU
• final balance = cash account balance + account balance at bank A +
account balance at bank B + account balance at bank C
• your earnings = final balance - initial balance
Example 1: Assume that your cash account balance is 1000 ECU, that your
account balance at bank A is 2500 ECU, that your account balance at bank
B is 2000 ECU, and that your account balance at bank C is 1500 ECU at the
end of the study. Then, your final balance is equal to
1000 ECU + 2500 ECU + 2000 ECU + 1500 ECU = 7000 ECU.
Hence, your earnings amount to
7000 ECU - 3000 ECU = 4000 ECU
or 16 CHF, respectively. Hence, and together with the participation fee of 20
CHF, you would have earned 36 CHF in total in this example.
The three banks do not have connections among each other, that is,
each bank is independent of the respective other two.7 In order to be able
to finance the interest of 5% which you will receive for each of your bank account
balances in each round, each bank invests all deposits of all study participants
in your group into a project at the end of each round. With a probability of
50% each, this project can either generate a return of 15% or a return
of -5%.8 The liquid assets of a bank consist of the balances of the depositors in
your group as well as the accumulated returns from projects. Depending on past
realized returns, at a certain point in time the liquid assets of any bank can thus
be larger, smaller, or equal to the sum of balances of the depositors. Net profits of
any bank are then equal to the difference between the bank’s liquid assets and the
study participants’ balances in your group. In each round, you will see a diagram
showing the level of past net profits for every bank.
Please note that if a bank should have negative net profits in round 20, there
are no sufficient liquid funds left to pay out all balances and interests at the end
of the study, as every bank finances interest payments through their profits. In
this case, every study participant in your group will be credited with a share of the
bank’s value that is equivalent to the share of his bank balance relative to the sum
7In Treatment 3, this sentence reads: Bank A and bank B are connected. Bank C is
independent from the other two banks.
8In Treatments 2 and 3, this sentence reads: This project can either generate a return
of 15% or a return of -5%.
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Example on how to calculate your earnings
Example 2: Assume that your cash account balance is 500 ECU, that your
account balance at bank A is 0 ECU, that your account balance at bank B is
1000 ECU, and that your account balance at bank C is 1000 ECU at the end
of the study. Then, your final balance is equal to
500 ECU + 0 ECU + 1000 ECU + 1000 ECU = 2500 ECU.
Hence, your earnings amount to
2500 ECU - 3000 ECU = -500 ECU
or -2 CHF, respectively. Hence, and together with the participation fee of 20
CHF, you would have earned 18 CHF in total in this example.
of all bank balances.
A withdrawal means withdrawing a certain amount from a bank account. If in
a given round the sum of all withdrawals requested from the participants in your
group is larger than the liquid funds of the bank concerned, then this bank will be
liquidated. Each study participant in your group will then be credited a share of
the bank’s liquidation value on his cash account that is equivalent to the share of
his bank balance relative to the sum of all bank balances. In subsequent rounds,
no more withdrawals from or deposits in this bank will be possible.
Example on how a bank is liquidated
Example 1: Assume that you have a balance of 4000 ECU at one of the banks.
Also assume that the sum of deposits of all study participants in your group at
this bank is equal to 40’000 ECU. Furthermore assume that, at the moment,
the bank only has liquid funds (that is, the sum of all current deposits plus
returns from previous rounds) in the amount of 30’000 ECU. Should the sum
of all requested withdrawals now be equal to, for example, 35’000 ECU, then
the bank is not able to pay out the entire requested sum. For each participant,
his share of total deposits is now calculated (in your case, this would be equal
to 4000 ECU / 40’000 ECU = 10%). Hence, you would receive and be credited
on your cash account with 10% of the currently available 30’000 ECU, that is,
3000 ECU.
We will now once more explain to you the procedure of this study using the
screens that you will see. In each round, there are two different screens respectively
stages. In each stage, you will see the current round in the upper left and the
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remaining time in the upper right corner. For each stage you have a maximum of
30 seconds. If you haven’t entered and confirmed any input yet after this time has
expired, no changes will be made to your current account balances and you will be
directed to the next stage respectively round. In each round, stage 1 (withdrawals)
and stage 2 (deposits) together allow you to change the division of your deposits
across your three bank accounts as well as your cash account.
Stage 1: You will see information regarding all past net profits of the three
banks, regarding current net profits of the three banks as well as regarding your
current balance in cash and at the three banks A, B, and C. In comparison to
the respective previous round, your balance at each bank will have increased by an
interest of 5%. You can withdraw any amount up to and including the balance of
your bank account from one or more than one of your bank accounts and add it
to your cash balance.9
Click on “test” to see your requested withdrawals. Then click on “change” to
change your requested withdrawals. If you do not want to change your withdrawals,
click on “confirm” to go to the next stage. Please note that your entries will only
take effect once you have clicked on “confirm”.
Your bank balances must not be overdrawn here, that is, you cannot withdraw
more from any given bank account than is available there. Should you overdraw
one or more than one of your bank accounts, clicking on “test” would trigger the
following notification:
In this case, click on “adjust” in order to go back to the withdrawal stage and
9The screenshots presented here are translations from the German experiment.
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Notification
Attention: These withdrawals will overdraw your bank balance. Please adjust
your withdrawals in such a way that you do not overdraw your bank balance.
adjust your withdrawals accordingly.
Should a bank be liquidated in a given round, then you will see the following
notification after confirming your requested withdrawals:
Notification
Bank . . . is bankrupt and will be liquidated. Appropriate to the share of your
deposits relative to the sum of all deposits, you will be credited the amount of
. . . ECU on your cash account.
The liquidation of the respective bank is permanent, that is, withdrawals from
and deposits into this bank will not be possible any more for the remaining duration
of the study. Then click on “OK” in order to go to the next screen.
Stage 2: You will see information regarding all past net profits of the three
banks, regarding current net profits of the three banks as well as regarding your
current balance in cash and at the three banks A, B, and C. You can newly
deposit any amount up to and including the balance of your cash account from
your cash account at one or more than one of the three banks A, B, and C. The
amount that you do not deposit at one or more than one of the three banks A, B,
and C you will keep as a cash balance.
Your cash balance must not be overdrawn here, that is, the sum of your
requested deposits at the banks must not be larger than the balance of your cash
account. Should you overdraw your cash account, clicking on “test” would trigger
the following notification:
Notification
Attention: These deposits will overdraw your cash balance. The sum of your
deposits is larger than your available cash balance. Please adjust your deposits
in such a way that you do not overdraw your cash balance.
In this case, click on “adjust” in order to go back to the deposit stage and
adjust your deposits accordingly. Please note that there will be no more stage 2 in
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round 20.
Should all three banks be liquidated before round 20, the following notification
would appear:
Notification
All three banks are bankrupt and have been liquidated. The study is thus
finished. Please click “OK” for as long as this notification appears. Then,
please wait a moment until the closing questionnaire appears and until your
will be called for your payment.
Finally, at the end of today’s study you will be asked to fill in a short question-
naire on the computer screen.
Comprehension questions
Now, please answer the enclosed comprehension questions regarding the procedure
of today’s study and raise your hand afterward. We will then come to your seat
to check your answers and settle any further questions. As soon as all answers of
all participants have been checked and there are no further questions, please wait
until the study begins.
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1.7.3 Control questions and solutions for all treatments
Question 1: Which interests do the four different depositing possibilities offer in
each round?
Answer: bank A: 5%, bank B: 5%, bank C: 5%, cash: 0%.
Question 2: Assume that at the end of this study, and after subtracting the initial
balance, you will have earned a total of 2500 ECU. How much will you be paid out
in total in CHF then (that is, including the participation fee)?
Answer: 2500250 + 20 = 30.
Question 3: When will a bank be liquidated?
Answer: A bank is liquidated if the sum of all requested withdrawals of the study
participants in your group is larger than the liquid funds of the respective bank.
Question 4: Assume that a bank goes bankrupt. Die bank had deposits in the
amount of 50’000 ECU, but liquid funds of only 40’000 ECU. Your balance at this
bank was 10’000 ECU last. Which payout in ECU will you receive then?
Answer: 10
′000
50′000 · 40′000 = 8000.
Question 5: Assume that at the end of this study, and after subtracting the initial
balance, you will have made a total loss of 1000 ECU. How much will you be paid
out in total in CHF then (that is, including the participation fee)?
Answer: −1000250 = 16.
Question 6: Will this study last for 20 rounds in all cases?
Answer: No.
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Chapter 2
Is scapegoating harmful for performance improve-
ment?
Amelie Brune
Abstract. Whether in business, politics, or sports, groups replacing their man-
agers, top politicians, or coaches after the group itself performed badly at a given
event seems to be a widespread phenomenon. In this paper, we study whether the
underlying mechanism for this behavior is scapegoating, and if so, what impact
this has on future performance. Analyzing data obtained from a laboratory exper-
iment which we designed in order to study these questions, we find that up to 40%
of teams with relative poor performance knowingly assign responsibility for their
situation to their coach, when in fact they are aware that they caused this result
themselves, and are thus scapegoating by definition. Furthermore, we find that
scapegoating teams are less likely to increase their performance over time relative
to non-scapegoating teams. Our results provide first experimental evidence of the
existence of scapegoating in teams, and aims at raising awareness with respect to
the potentially adverse effects on future performance improvement.
JEL classification: C91, D71.
Keywords: Performance, responsibility, scapegoats.
2.1 Introduction
The following headline may be encountered rather frequently as news around the
globe:
Football coach dismissed after horrible defeat
Most likely, the reader will have come across such news before. A football team
has failed to win an important match and, subsequently, its coach is dismissed.
Similar examples can be found in all areas of public life: Companies dismiss man-
agers after detecting flaws in production, parties remove senior politicians after
public scandals, and the government dismisses public service employees after bad
operations.
Breaking down these examples into their organizational elements, one can ob-
serve a common underlying structure: An individual agent or entity guides a group
of agents in producing a certain good, where the group’s performance is measurable.
If the group perceives its performance to be low at a certain trigger event, they de-
cide to replace their guiding agent in expectation of better results in the future.
Guiding agents may also choose or be forced to resign, but the resulting scenario
is essentially the same. A related scenario is team production of a certain good by
means of a given complementary production factor. Using an example from finance,
one may consider two heterogenous traders working through a trading platform as
facilitating entity. A classic example in economics is that of two workers producing
a good in a factory, or even that of two oarsmen covering a certain distance in a
rowboat, to mention a more illustrative example. Also from this angle, agents can –
individually or as a group – claim the complementary non-human production factor
to be the intrinsic cause for observed poor performance.
Among various possible psychological reasons for such behavior, our claim is that
the underlying mechanism is scapegoating, i.e., the process of (at least partially)
transferring responsibility for poor performance which is due to one’s own fault to
a third party, and that this is obstructive to improving performance in the future.
Despite the far-reaching consequences that evidence for these claims would have for
meritocracy, this exact phenomenon has not yet been studied by experimentalists
to the best of our knowledge. Empirical support for our claim would offer insights
into the motives for replacing managers, top politicians, and coaches, and help
to understand why performance does not necessarily have to improve after such
observed changes.
From a theoretical point of view in the psychology literature, Rothschild, Lan-
dau, Sullivan, and Keefer [2012] propose a dual-motive model of scapegoating,
where the first channel they describe is the transfer of responsibility for a negative
outcome to a third party in order to reduce feelings of guilt when the outcome
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was at least partially caused by the individual. The second channel is to increase
perceived control over events where the outcome’s result was beyond one’s zone of
influence. The authors also offer empirical support for their theory by conduct-
ing three survey-based experimental studies in which they show the existence of
scapegoating by manipulating a given negative event, such as general environmen-
tal destruction, through either of the theoretical channels described above, test
for possible solutions to scapegoating, and investigate possible obstacles in imple-
menting such solutions. They find that, depending on whether or not the agent was
responsible for the negative event, scapegoating can be motivated for both channels
as described by their model. Within each channel of scapegoating, the opportunity
to affirm either individual moral integrity or perceived personal control is shown
to erase the previously established matter of scapegoating. However, there is no
evidence for cross-effects, e.g., increasing perceived personal control does not can-
cel scapegoating motivated by personally influenced negative events. However, the
authors also find that despite this possibility to erase scapegoating by means of
fostering introspection in the respective domain, the mechanism fails to work if an
attainable scapegoat is at hand. In our paper, we conduct an economically founded
laboratory experiment that ventures along the first channel of scapegoating as sug-
gested by Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, and Keefer [2012], i.e., scapegoating after
events that were influenced by the agent of interest in a negative way. Regarding
the design of our study, instead of conducting surveys, we propose an interactive
experimental design which directly places each subject into a tangible real-life sit-
uation of scapegoating. Moreover, we expand our research focus by asking which
impact scapegoating has on future performance.
A commentary most closely related to the idea of our paper is written by Gamson
and Scotch [1964], in which the authors argue that scapegoating is the intrinsic
mechanism behind managerial changes in major league baseball clubs. They argue
that the outcome of a game is essentially determined by the players’ talent, while the
quality of the team’s coach can be considered as relatively constant. The authors
then put forward that scapegoating may be used to reduce anxiety within the team,
and that it shows the psychological connection between the dismissal of the manager
and the hope to improve team performance in the future, while it is actually only
the team who can effectively increase output. As such, the authors also conjecture
that there should be no observable increase in performance which can merely be
attributed to a change in managers. With our paper, we can contribute to this more
than 50-year-old question by the design and implementation of a stylized laboratory
experiment.
Among other papers which evolve around responsibility shifting, Chang, Solomon,
and Westerfield [2016] use an individually performed trading game experiment to
show that cognitive dissonance can explain the disposition effect, i.e., the phe-
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nomenon that agents tend to realize gains rather than losses, in stocks and the
reverse-disposition effect, i.e., the phenomenon that agents tend to realize losses
instead of keeping them, in delegated assets such as mutual funds. Cognitive dis-
sonance, which describes a state of negative feelings caused by the realization that
one’s past decisions were sub-optimal, is shown to drive the blaming of managers for
poor fund performance in order to restore individual perception about personal in-
vestment skills. The authors also show that the reverse disposition effect is stronger
for higher salience of asset delegation. While our paper relates to the one of Chang,
Solomon, and Westerfield [2016] in the sense that we also study unjustified blam-
ing, or scapegoating, it differs in that we focus on group rather than individual
performance, and generalize the latter through the implementation of a real-effort
game. Moreover, we study the existence of scapegoating rather than its motivating
factors. In an experiment using dictator games extended by delegation and punish-
ment possibilities by Bartling and Fischbacher [2012], decision rights for potentially
unfair allocations are shown to be delegated in order to avoid taking responsibility
for the implementation of the allocation at hand. While our paper also aims at
investigating the circumstances under which responsibility is transferred, we do not
include the possibility to delegate decision rights. Using a survey-based approach,
Brown and White [2010] find that a negative relation to one’s organization increases
the probability to attribute responsibility of a given crisis to this entity, and that
scapegoating proves to be the most prevalent of four possible crisis response strate-
gies analyzed. Again, our paper ventures along the same topic of scapegoating.
However, we focus on group performance under a guiding agent rather than on the
relationship to the latter as the driver of scapegoating. In an empirical panel study
by Boeker [1992], the author finds that personal power reduces the likelihood for
top managers to get dismissed during times of poor performance of their organiza-
tion, as this enables them to shift responsibility for poor performance toward the
next-lower managerial level, which then suffers from scapegoating. The author also
touches upon the link between scapegoating and future performance, where the
latter is believed to be improved after changes of managers from the perspective of
the organization. While our paper aims at offering an experimental investigation of
scapegoating and its effects on future performance, we do not consider the impact
of power of the guiding agent. With our paper, we may however address Boeker
[1992]’s note that his overall conclusion depends on the industry-specificity of his
data. With our generalized, stylized experiment, we hope to be able to contribute
to the analysis and understanding of scapegoating and its consequences for future
performance. Finally, Brune [2011] analyzes the effect of different types of au-
thorities on the quality of group coordination within the framework of a minimum
coordination game. She distinguishes between the existence and type of authority,
where the latter differentiates between either democratically elected or randomly
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imposed authorities, as well as the authority’s capability to punish individual group
members for defection. The author finds that the existence of an authority who
recommends contributions to group members improves coordination, and that this
is more important than the type of authority. While there are similar design el-
ements such as the presence of a guiding agent and a group which is required to
generate output, the main difference between Brune [2011] and this paper is that
it is not the guiding agent who can dismiss group members for performing badly,
but the group members who can dismiss their guiding agent if he is believed to
be the main responsible party for a given outcome. In this respect, the tables of
punishment power are turned in this paper.
In conclusion, while the current literature does address questions of responsibil-
ity attribution, there is no experiment on the existence of scapegoating in poorly
performing groups of agents and its effect on future performance to the best of our
knowledge. With our paper, we aim at filling this gap in the literature. In order to
test our conjectures, we use an experimental setting in order to identify causality
between poor performance, the replacement of guiding agents, and future perfor-
mance development. With this approach, we are able to control the environment
in which decisions are made, generate data which may be unobservable in the real
world, and ensure validity through monetary incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes our
experimental hypotheses, Section 2.3 presents the experimental design, and Section
2.4 describes our behavioral predictions. Section 2.5 shows and Section 2.6 discusses
the results of our experiment, concludes, and offers directions for future research.
2.2 Hypotheses
We conjecture that scapegoating is the mechanism behind the replacement of guid-
ing agents after poor team performance, and that, furthermore, if this is true, this
is harmful to the improvement of performance in the future. While we propose an
array of different real-life examples in Section 2.1 in order to motivate this paper,
and while our leading example of a football team and its coach inspires our exper-
imental design, we would like to emphasize that in the following, we abstract from
them in constructing our experiment and do not attempt to replicate this situation
in a direct manner. In this sense, the use of terms such as “coach” and “team”,
as well as connotations such as interaction, acquaintance, or the power of decision
over coach replacements shall not be interpreted as a direct image of any of the
afore-mentioned real-life examples. Our goal is to propose a stylized experiment in
order to capture the non-trivial essence of the presented problem, and abstracting
from real-life examples allows us to create a flexible experimental framework to
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study the unjustified attribution of responsibility for poor performance, which may
be extended in various directions later on. Nevertheless, applications of our results
to real-life situations can be made at the end of this paper for illustrative purposes.
Our conjectures stem from the observation of multiple real-life situations where
changes on a managerial level often seem to follow after poor performance of re-
spective subordinates. While we postulate our hypotheses about the underlying
mechanism of such situations in Table 2.1, we provide a theoretical discussion in-
cluding a theoretical benchmark against which to interpret our results in Section
2.4. This allows for an elaboration within the terminology of the experimental
setting as described in the following section.
H1: Members of teams with poor relative performance which can be attributed to
the team’s own fault knowingly shift responsibility for this poor performance
onto a third party.
H2: If hypothesis H1 is true, then the difference between the improvement in
team performance of non-scapegoating groups and the improvement in team
performance of scapegoating groups is positive, i.e., scapegoating proves to
be an obstacle in improving team performance.
Table 2.1: Experimental hypotheses.
In the following, we describe an experimental design which allows us to test
these hypotheses.
2.3 Experimental design
In order to test our hypotheses as presented in Section 2.2, we design a laboratory
experiment which can be used to identify the existence of scapegoating as well as to
study the development of future performance depending on how poor performance
has been dealt with before. The experiment is divided into two parts: A pre-
session and the main sessions. The former serves as a selection mechanism for some
subjects to perform the role of a coach in the main sessions, where they are assigned
to teams of two subjects each. Together, they play against another unity of team
and coach by means of a real-effort game.
The pre-session is designed in order to select subjects for the roles of coach and
replacement coach as required in the main sessions. Subjects individually perform
a real-effort game, which consists of adding as many of ten sets of three double-digit
numbers1 as possible within one minute and where each correctly solved problem
is given one point. This task is repeated over ten periods. Based on the individual
average number of points obtained by the end of period 10, the top 20% of subjects
1Numbers are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of integers between 10 and 99.
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are selected, which are offered a bonus of 100 ECU2 in order to create an additional
incentive to exert effort in the game described. To operationalize the fraction of
top performing subjects in a convenient way, the pre-session is conducted with 10
subjects, thus leaving the best two subjects with the roles of coach and replacement
coach for the main experimental session. Whether the best or second best subject
is given either role is random.3 The result of one of the ten periods is randomly
selected for payment, and this number also represents the coach’s performance x
in the main sessions, where the coach is represented by his performance data only
and, thus, his performance is exogenous.
The experiment in the main sessions consists of two periods and is designed as
a between-subjects experiment.
In period 1, subjects are randomly assigned to teams of two, which is the smallest
possible representation of a group or team and thus allows us to maximize the
number of observations with respect to team choices. The coach who is determined
in the pre-session is now assigned to each team, and each subject is endowed with
200 ECU. Half of all teams is labeled team A and the other half is labeled team
B. One team A and team B each and their respective coaches are then randomly
matched to play against each other. The task for each team and its coach is to
maximize output through the same real-effort game as used in the pre-session,
however with only one period thereof.4 The task is performed individually by each
subject at the same time. Each correctly solved problem is given one point. Team
j’s total number of points, gj , is then determined by the sum of points achieved
by the two team members times the number of points obtained by the coach. The
underlying production function can thus be described by
gj = xj
(
2∑
i=1
yji
)
, (2.1)
where for each team j, xj denotes the coach’s performance and yji denotes the
performance of subject i. Hence, the performance of the coach has a leveraging
effect on team performance as his contribution enters the production function in
a multiplicative way. Note that both xj and yji are determined by ability, which
2Experimental currency units.
3Recall that we abstract from the real-life examples stated in Section 2.1. While there are
many possible interpretations and applications of our experiment to real-life situations, the ex-
perimental design is bound to abstract from both particular situations and their organizational
details. As such, the selection mechanism for coaches is not intended to follow any particular
real-life procedure, but rather to provide a basic legitimization for certain subjects to perform the
role of the coach in the main sessions.
4A trial period consisting only of the real-effort game precedes the actual experiment. This is
in order to allow subjects to familiarize themselves with the task, and to avoid potential learning
effects in period 2. We understand learning as an increase in the number of correctly solved
problems due to familiarity with the environment in which this task is performed. This is different
from an increase due to higher effort.
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is fixed in the short run, and effort, which is flexible in the short run. Hence,
we assume it to be possible to increase individual output through increased effort
between periods 1 and 2. Within each game, the team with the larger value of g
wins. It is communicated to each subject whether his team won or lost, as well as
by how much they did so. Where a game ended in a draw, both teams involved
are considered as winners. Each subject earns ∆g in ECU, which is the difference
between gj , generated by his own team j, and gk, generated by the opposing team
k. Hence, each subject in the winning team earns ∆g > 0 which is added to
his endowment. Likewise, each subject in the losing team loses the same amount
(since ∆g < 0 here) which is subtracted from his endowment. This is communicated
to each subject, as well. The purpose of the endowment is to create a reference
point from which any loss is perceived as more harmful than a gain of the same
magnitude (see Kahneman and Tversky [1979]), such that subjects in the losing
team experience strong disutility from losing. Subjects are therefore expected to
exercise maximum effort in the real-effort game in order to avoid losing throughout
the experiment, or at least to try to increase effort after losing in period 1. Due to
the multiplicative form of equation 2.1, even small differences in either y1 or y2 can
have a large impact on g. If ∆g < 0, poor performance of one team member thus
has the potential to significantly increase the distance to the other team, |∆g|, and
thereby the magnitude of deduction from current endowments. In other words, this
captures the degree of influence that the poorly performing team member has on
the outcome of the game, which can be translated to the share of responsibility he
effectively bears.
Within each team, the poorly performing subject receives complete informa-
tion about the composition of gj , i.e., the coach’s contribution xj , the other team
member’s contribution yjhigh, as well as his personal contribution y
j
low. The well-
performing subject only receives information about his personal contribution yjhigh.
The instructions are written in such a way that the well-performing subject within
each team cannot infer from the information presented to him that he must have
performed better than the other team member. The respective passage only men-
tions that information about the number of points of some study participants in-
volved is presented, but it does not clarify which information exactly is provided,
nor does it say what the access to information will depend on (see Appendix 2.7.3).
Hence, the non-existence of information about the other team member’s or the
coach’s contribution cannot lead the well-performing subject to the conclusion that
he holds the position of the better performing team member. The poorly perform-
ing subject knows that the better performing subject does not know about his full
information set and is thus unaware of the actual cause underlying realized team
output. Also, subjects cannot update their beliefs about the information structure
over time, as information is only presented once in period 1.
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Afterward, each subject is asked to provide his judgement about whom he deems
responsible for the outcome of the game. He can choose between the coach, himself,
the other team member, or the team (i.e., himself and the other team member as a
group). Subjects make their responses simultaneously. Then, each subject’s choice
is presented to the other team member within his team. If the team lost and
both team members make the coach responsible for this outcome, then the latter
is replaced by the replacement coach for period 2. If the team won, the coach
cannot be replaced. Other than this, winning and losing teams naturally also differ
with respect to total team output, Y , which manoeuvres them in the respective
winning or losing position. If it is true that poorly performing subjects are inclined
to scapegoat when they have to reveal the probable underlying cause for bad team
output, then the poorly performing subject should choose to tell the other subject
that the coach was responsible for this outcome. If he does so, he does it in full
knowledge that it is not true. Thus, this mechanism represents the very definition
of scapegoating, i.e., to knowingly attribute false responsibility for individual failure
to a third party in order to regain personal self-esteem within groups, and thereby
allows for an isolation of scapegoating. To anticipate our empirical analysis, the
action of indicating the coach is our indicator for the existence of scapegoating.
At the end of period 1, each subject is privately shown his updated endowment.
Period 2 is a repetition of period 1 with the exception that no further respon-
sibility assignment through voting takes place, as the experiment ends after this
period. Each team plays against the same team it was paired with in period 1.
Also, if both members of the losing team in the previous period attributed respon-
sibility to their coach, the replacement coach takes the position of his predecessor,
about which the respective teams are informed at the beginning. At the end, total
earnings are calculated and privately shown. The final payoff for each subject is
composed of a show-up fee of 15 CHF, the endowment of 200 ECU, as well as the
sum of earnings made from each period, which can be positive or negative. Total
profits, i.e., the sum of endowment and per-period profits, is bounded by 0 from
below, which is in order to protect subjects from extremely high losses which may
occur if paired with a very well-performing group while their own performance is
extremely low. At the same time, these parameters settle the distribution of g over
its most probable range for subjects with average problem solving abilities. The
exchange rate between ECU and CHF is 20 : 1.
To conclude, note that the motivation behind conducting the pre-session is to
provide the legitimization for subjects to be chosen to perform the role of coach in
the main sessions. The coach has to bear a certain level of proficiency in performing
the real-effort game, and thus the capability of genuinely improving team output as
described earlier. Moreover, conducting the pre-session enables us to increase the
number of observations in the main session, as we are able to economize on subjects
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who otherwise would have to act as potential replacement coaches in period 2. Also,
it allows for comparability across games, as we use the same subjects to perform
the roles of coach and replacement coach in each team, respectively.
At the end of the study, subjects are asked to fill in a short questionnaire to elicit
socio-economic parameters, attitudes toward trust, risk, and losses, social prefer-
ences5, their personally perceived effort made in solving the calculation problems
presented, as well as their motivation underlying their choice of the entity they
believed to bear main responsibility for the game’s outcome in period 16.
2.4 Behavioral predictions
We can interpret our experimental design in the light of a repeated two-stage
simultaneous-move game of complete information according to the classification of
Gibbons [1992]. The experimental situation shall be classified as being of complete
rather than incomplete information as the well-performing subject in each group is
unaware that the other team member has access to more information, as this is not
discussed in the instructions. Moreover, both subjects know the respective other
player’s payoff, as both obtain ∆g. Within this framework, we can analyze in which
cases it is rational to replace the coach, and in which cases it is irrational. The
latter is the situation where scapegoating, i.e., the wilful and unjustified attribution
of responsibility for poor group performance to the coach can arise.
The payoff structure for each team member is determined by the value of the
production function g of his own team, j, and by that of the opposing team, k,
(see equation 2.1), or, in short, by his team’s distance to the opposing team, ∆g.
Each subject’s best strategy is to maximize individual effort in the real-effort game
given their personal ability and given the circumstances at the beginning of the
experiment. Ex ante, the probability to win the game in period 1 is Prob(win) = 12 ,
as subjects are randomly distributed over teams such that individual ability and
the propensity to exert effort are evenly distributed, and coaches are equally good
across groups, which is both common knowledge. Applying Bayesian updating, the
probability of a team to win in period 2 given that it has already won in period 1
is Prob(win | win) > 12 , given the persisting effect of individual ability. Likewise,
the probability of a team to lose in period 2 given that is has already lost in period
1 is Prob(lose | lose) > 12 . Ex ante, poorly performing teams in period 1 are more
5These are the same standardized questions as used and explained in Chapter 1 (see Appendix
1.7.1). The lotteries presented in the lottery choice task which are used to elicit the degree of loss
aversion were scaled down by a factor 10 in order to match the scale of resulting lottery earnings
with previous earnings from the scapegoating game using the same exchange rate between ECU
and CHF.
6With the exception of this last question, the questionnaires for the pre-session and the main
sessions are the same.
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likely to stay in a losing position in period 2 given fixed ability in the short run,
unless more effort is exerted in order to compensate for lower ability. While any
number y˜i might be the individually perceived maximum possible effort in period
1, after observing his team losing the first game, this figure may shift to a higher
level yˆi (with yˆi > y˜i), such that effort is still able to increase. Returning to the ex
ante situation, the probability to switch status over time is smaller than 12 , i.e.,
Prob(win | lose) < 1
2
and Prob(lose | win) < 1
2
.
While an increase in perceived maximum possible effort from y˜i to yˆi has the poten-
tial to affect these probabilities, changing the coach does not, as his performance is
fixed and on a top level. Hence, expected payoffs cannot be increased (or decreased)
by changing the coach. Therefore, the rational benchmark is that
Prob(change coach) = 0.
This can be considered as the Nash equilibrium. Any contrary observations in the
experiment, i.e., any replacements of coaches should thus be considered as irrational.
Note that teams who scapegoat would believe that Prob(win | lose) > 12 in case of
a new coach, whereas it is effectively still smaller than 12 or could only pass the
threshold of 12 through higher effort, but not through a new coach.
A subject could rationally dismiss his coach if he finds him to be less skilled
than expected. The information set that the poorly performing subject has about
the coach is that his performance can have a theoretical range between 0 and
10, and that he was drawn from among the top 20% of subjects in the pre-session.
Assuming a normal distribution of correctly solved calculation problems with µ = 5
and σ = 1.5, for instance, the top 20% would encompass any number between 6.4
and 10. Therefore, it would be rational to replace the coach for reasons of unrealized
quality expectations if x ≤ 6 is revealed at the end of period 1. Regarding the well-
performing subject within the losing team, while he has no access to information
about the actual performance of the coach, he can still perform the same reasoning
about the expected quality using N (µ, σ) and his personal (good) performance as
a benchmark, intrinsically knowing whether he solved the task well or badly.
Based on these considerations, we make the following conjectures for our experi-
ment: One, the percentage of losing teams who (unanimously) assign responsibility
for the outcome of the game to the coach is significantly larger than zero, i.e.,
scapegoating can be observed. In particular, the fraction of poorly performing sub-
jects within losing teams which assigns responsibility to the coach is significantly
larger than that of well-performing subjects in the same teams. And two, using
a difference-in-difference approach, the improvement in performance over time in
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scapegoating losing teams is significantly smaller than in non-scapegoating losing
teams. Both conjectures are motivated by real-life observations as elaborated on in
Section 2.1 and can be checked against the theoretical benchmark as discussed in
this section.
2.5 Results
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher [2007])7 and conducted
in March and April 2017. We recruited subjects using the University Registration
Center for Study Participants of the University of Zurich, where we required partic-
ipants to have taken part in at least one previous study and to understand German
well. This is because subjects who participated in an experiment before know the
laboratory environment and the experimental procedures, which simplifies the real-
ization of the study, and because the experiment was conducted in German. There
were 10 subjects in the pre-session and a total of 116 subjects8 distributed over five
main sessions, all of which were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental and
Behavioral Economics at the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich.
Each session lasted 45 minutes on average.
Detailed written instructions were distributed to each subject before the start of
the experiment for them to read carefully (see Appendix 2.7.1 and 2.7.3). A set of
control questions had to be answered correctly in order to check their understanding
of the procedures of the experiment. Answers were checked by the experimenter,
and false ones indicated and explained individually (see Appendix 2.7.2 and 2.7.4).
Subjects earned 30.80 CHF in the pre-session and 25 CHF on average9 in the
main sessions. In the pre-session, the average age was 25.3. 30% were male and
80% were of Swiss origin. With 40% of subjects, the majority reported monthly
disposable income within the bracket of 1000 CHF and 1500 CHF. In the main
sessions, the average age of study participants was 23.9. 40% were male and 77%
were of Swiss origin. 34% reported monthly disposable income of up to 500 CHF
with income skewed to the right overall. The distribution of the reported fields
of studies of all participants is shown in Table 2.2. We find that both reported
fields of studies and income brackets show no abnormalities for the typical range of
participants recruited from our data bank.
7The code is available upon request.
8This number includes 16 subjects from a pilot session, where the show-up fee was 10 CHF
and x = 8 (as compared to 15 CHF and x = 9) as initial parameter values. Changes in the
fixed show-up fee should not alter subjects’ behavior during the experiment, and both values of
x are within a probable range for a performance to be among the top 20% of the population (for
instance, assuming a normal distribution with µ = 5 and σ = 1.5, any number between 6.4 and
10 lies within the upper 20% of the distribution. Hence, as these differences are negligible, we
decided to integrate the data obtained from the pilot session into the data analysis in order to
increase the number of observations.
9This figure takes into account an additional 5 CHF for the pilot session.
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Field of studies Pre-session Main sessions
Arts, humanities, and political sciences 14%
Computer sciences 2%
Engineering and architecture 12%
Law 8%
Mechanical and electrical engineering 5%
Mathematics 3%
Medical sciences 9%
Natural sciences 60% 24%
Economics 10% 9%
Other/not specified 30% 14%
Table 2.2: Overview of participants’ reported fields of studies.
Displayed is the percentage of subjects reporting a given field of studies in the pre-session and in
the main sessions.
In the pre-session, the random selection of one period outcome of each of the two
players in the top 20% yielded x = 9 each, which are the data that were used for the
contributions of coach and replacement coach in the main experimental sessions.
As such, the team is solely responsible for the outcome of the game as determined
by the production function (see page 51).
We study losing teams against the theoretical benchmark as discussed in Section
2.4. Winning teams are studied as an additional control and in order to gain further
information about these subjects’ behavior.
We collected observations for 29 games involving 58 teams, out of which 25
teams lost and 33 teams won the game or ended undecided. In the following,
winning teams denote teams that won their game in period 1. This label stays
fixed for period 2 in order to allow for a comparison of these groups’ change in
performance over time. The analogous holds true for losing teams. Similarly to
the definition of ties, subjects within any team who obtained the same number of
points in any period were both labeled a good player or well-performing subject.
Winning teams Losing teams ∆Y¯
Period 1 6.41 4.96 1.45
Period 2 6.79 5.70 1.09
∆t 0.38 0.74
Table 2.3: Average contributions of winning and losing teams.
Displayed is the average number of correctly solved calculation problems in the real-effort game
within each team. ∆Y denotes the difference in average contributions between winning and
losing teams in each period. ∆t denotes the differences in average team performance over time
for winning and losing teams, respectively.
Table 2.3 reports average contributions as well as differences in contributions
for winning and losing teams over time. Winning teams make larger average contri-
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butions than losing teams in both periods (∆Y¯ > 0). In each group, performance
slightly improves over time (∆t > 0), although not in a statistically significant
way: For both groups, the null (H0: ∆t = 0) cannot be rejected in favor of the
right-sided alternative (p-value equal to 0.0336 for winning teams and 0.0029 for
losing teams). The null of equal performance improvements across groups (H0:
∆t(winning teams) −∆t(losing teams) = 0) cannot be rejected.
Winning teams Losing teams
Bad player Good player Bad player Good player
Oneself 29% 17% 77% 32%
Other player 13% 3% 14%
Team 29% 66% 14% 18%
Coach 29% 14% 9% 36%
Table 2.4: Distribution of responsibility attribution by type of player.
Displayed is the percentage of subjects within each of four different categories of teams who
indicated themselves, the respective other player in their team, their team as a whole, or their
coach to be the main responsible party for the game’s outcome.
Table 2.4 summarizes the fractions of poorly and well-performing subjects in
winning and losing teams which attributed responsibility for their game’s outcome
to different parties. Interestingly, with 77% the vast majority of all poorly perform-
ing subjects among those teams who lost stated that they see the responsibility for
their situation in themselves and thus their personal performance. 9% were truly
scapegoating in our original definition of the term: These subjects hold the coach
responsible for losing the game, even though they know that he contributes 9 units,
that the other team member contributed more units than the subject itself, and
thus that the game’s unfavorable outcome has to be attributed to their own per-
formance, as the majority correctly acknowledges. However, 36% of the better
performing subjects among losing teams deem the coach responsible. They do not
know the contributions made by the coach or the other team member, yet they
decide to blame the coach. This may be interpreted as a milder form of scape-
goating: Under incomplete information, blame is falsely attributed to the coach,
however the respective subjects could have assumed that the coach’s performance
was rather good, given that he was drawn from the top 20% of all subjects in
the pre-session. While he is the better performing subject in his team, they still
lost the game. At this point, a careful interpretation of this finding is the second
channel of scapegoating as postulated by Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, and Keefer
[2012], i.e., the aim to regain perceived control through scapegoating after negative
events that were not directly possible to influence by the agent of interest. Among
winning teams, 66% of well-performing subjects indicated that they deem the team
as a whole responsible for the favorable outcome of the game, whereas poorly per-
forming subjects show a more even distribution of responsibility assignments. In
58
fact, in this group 29% each assign responsibility to either the coach, oneself, or
the team as a whole.10 An analysis of the motivation which subjects stated to lie
behind their respective choices supports these findings. Good players in winning
teams credit their win to the team, as they place more attention to the value and
work ethic of the team. Bad players in losing teams credit their loss to themselves,
as they not only have a very realistic perception of their own calculation abilities,
but also acknowledge their realized weak performance within the team.
A closer look at the data of those subjects who were among bad players in
losing teams and who attributed responsibility to the coach reveals that, in fact,
they belonged to the bottom 36% of the distribution of points obtained by all
poorly performing subjects in losing teams. This is hence an indication for poorly
performing individuals to indeed put blame onto a third party. In particular, it
has to be noted that their distance in performance relative to their teammate was
between 4 and 7 points and relative to their coach between 6 and 8 points.
To obtain a tangible measure of scapegoating, we define s as the number of
coach dismissals, d, relative to the number of groups, n, for all losing teams:
s =
d
n
.
Since s ∈ [0, 1] by construction, we are thus able to generate a probability measure
for scapegoating. We can furthermore distinguish between a strong (first-order)
and a weak (second-order) version of this measurement, where we define s1 for all
losing teams where both members and s2 where at least one member voted in favor
of dismissing their coach. We find that s1 = 8% and s2 = 40% in support of our
hypothesis H1, i.e., that members of teams with poor relative performance which
can be attributed to the team’s own fault knowingly shift responsibility for this
poor performance onto a third party.11 However, we also find that the fraction of
better performing subjects in losing teams who scapegoat is actually larger than
the fraction of worse performing subjects. Teams who scapegoated in the strong
definition of the term stated their wish to be allocated a new coach, or suspected
their coach of poor performance. Scapegoating teams in the weak definition also
stated that they did not wish to blame their teammate for poor results, and would
rather choose to blame their coach instead.
Figure 2.1 shows the development of team performance among scapegoating and
10Note that an individual’s choice of the coach as the main responsible party for the outcome of
the game bears intrinsically different connotations in winning and losing teams. If a subject in a
losing team indicates the coach as the main responsible party, it is an manifestation of scapegoating
as elaborated on in Section 2.3. However, if a subject in a winning team makes the same choice,
it has a rather positive connotation. As such, the implications of any option chosen in winning
and losing teams has to be assessed accordingly.
11The magnitude of first-order scapegoating, s1 = 8%, is not to be confused with the fraction
of poorly performing subjects in losing teams attributing responsibility to the coach as shown in
Table 2.4. s1 captures the fraction of losing teams where both subjects voted for the coach.
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Figure 2.1: Difference in improvement of team performance between scapegoating
and non-scapegoating losing teams.
Displayed is the development of average team performance over time in
scapegoating and non-scapegoating teams, with (a) and (b) displaying the
respective values for the strong and weak measure of scapegoating, s1 and s2.
non-scapegoating losing teams for our two different measurements of scapegoating,
s1 and s2. While all losing teams are able to improve their performance over time
on average (as shown in Table 2.3 for a general overview), it can also be seen that
the difference in improvement between scapegoating and non-scapegoating teams,
once differentiating losing teams with respect to these two sub-groups, is rather
small for both definitions. First-order scapegoating yields a difference-in-difference
measure of ∆1 = −0.01, where ∆1 is defined as
∆1 =
(
Y¯ nsgt=2 − Y¯ nsgt=1
)− (Y¯ sgt=2 − Y¯ sgt=1) .
Again, Y¯ denotes average team performance, and nsg/sg abbreviates non-scape-
goating and scapegoating teams, respectively. Our hypothesis H2 conjectured that
∆1 > 0, i.e., if hypothesis H1 is true, then the difference between the improvement
in team performance of non-scapegoating groups and the improvement in team
performance of scapegoating groups is positive, i.e., scapegoating proves to be an
obstacle in improving team performance. While our estimate for ∆1 shows the
opposite sign, we do find a positive difference for second-order scapegoating teams,
where ∆2 = 0.23. However, we find that this value is not significantly larger than
zero. For this to be the case, we would need to find a value of at least 1.3 at a
significance level of 5% in our data. On another note, it is interesting to observe
that in both periods, scapegoating teams perform significantly better on average in
the strong definition of the scapegoating measure: The null of H0: Y¯
sg
t − Y¯ nsgt = 0
can be rejected against the right-sided alternative at the 10%-level of significance
(with p-values equal to 0.0715 for t = 1 and 0.0870 for t = 2).
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Figure 2.2: Summary of findings for second-order scapegoating.
Displayed is the improvement in performance over time (measured on the left-hand
axis) and the fraction of coaches blamed for losing the game (measured on the
right-hand axis) for non-scapegoating and scapegoating teams, respectively).
Figure 2.2 summarizes our findings for hypotheses H1 and H2 for second-order
scapegoating. We find that, one, the fraction of losing teams who blame the coach
for losing the game is significantly larger than zero, and that, two, their increase in
performance over time tends to be smaller than that of non-scapegoating teams.
Finally, we perform some complementary analyses to obtain a better insight into
the relation between the propensity to scapegoat on the one hand and trust, risk
and loss aversion and social preferences on the other, as well as some robustness
checks.
To this end, we define four sub-groups according to their vote in period 1 (one-
self/other player/team/coach). For each sub-group, we then define an index to
further distinguish between the four different categories of performers (good/bad
players in winning/losing teams). We then compute correlations between each such
index and the degree of trust12, risk and loss aversion, and social preferences, re-
spectively, as reported in the questionnaire.
We find that poorly performing subjects who attribute responsibility for losing
12We compute correlations for all three measures of trust employed in the questionnaire (as
explained in Appendix 1.7.1). The scale of the second and third measures of trust are mirrored in
order to make them comparable with the first measure, i.e., so that a larger value of the respective
measure indicates a larger level of trust toward other individuals. Using more than one measure
of trust serves as a robustness check.
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the game to the coach have a considerably lower level of trust than other subjects
(correlations of up to r = −0.3239). The same is true for poorly performing subjects
in winning teams, although to a lesser extent (correlations of up to r = −0.0869).
Well-performing subjects in winning teams who believe the team as a whole to
be responsible for winning prove to have more trust in others (correlations of up
to r = 0.1360). Good players in both losing and winning teams who vote for
their teammate have more trust toward others (correlations of r = 0.1667 and
r = 0.1295, respectively). Scapegoating subjects also tend to be more risk averse.
The correlation between voting for the coach and showing poor performance in
losing teams is r = −0.2653, which proves to be the largest correlation with respect
to risk observed across all sub-groups. They also tend to exhibit a lower degree of
social preferences, as documented by the negative correlation of r = −0.2209, i.e.,
they have lower preference for helping others without expecting anything in return.
Subjects who scapegoat in the strict definition of the term tend to be more loss
averse than others (r = 0.1095).
With one exception, all subjects indicated that they believe to have made a
strong effort in solving the calculation exercises (a value of at least 4.3 on a scale
from 1 to 5), which is an indicator for well working financial incentives in our
experiment.
To conclude, comparing the performance data of periods 1 and 2 with those of
the trial period, we find that the difference in the number of points obtained from
the real-effort game, y, between the trial and the first period is always larger than
the difference between the first and the second period. This indicates the presence
of a learning effect from the trial period to period 1, which supports our decision
to include a trial period in order to reduce the possibility to confound learning
effects with increased effort from period 1 to period 2. We therefore assume that
the remaining observed difference between performance in period 1 and period 2
can be traced back not to learning, but to increased effort, as discussed in Section
2.4 on page 55.
Finally, in the spirit of a small cross-sectional study, we can make use of the
circumstance that the coach’s contribution was x = 8 in the pilot study and x = 9 in
the main sessions in order to check for rationality of coach dismissals. We find that
the fraction of poorly performing subjects wanting to dismiss the coach under x = 8
is more than six times larger than under x = 9. While ultimate conclusions from
this comparison have to be made with care due to the small number of observations
from the pilot study, it nevertheless gives a direction toward the behavior of poorly
performing subjects in losing teams: Coaches tend to be made responsible more
frequently if their performance is lower. This supports the rational benchmark as
described in Section 2.4, i.e., that coaches can be rationally dismissed, but only if
x ≤ 6. As x = 8 in our data, the fraction of coaches being made responsible can be
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attributed to irrational scapegoating.
2.6 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we study whether scapegoating is the mechanism behind the replace-
ment of coaches after poor team performance, and what effect this has on future
group performance. To address these questions, we design a laboratory experiment
where two teams consisting of two members each and their respective coach play
against each other in a real-effort game. Among losing teams, we find that up to
40% of teams blame their coach for the game’s unfavorable outcome, while they
are in fact aware that he cannot be held responsible for this. Moreover, we find
that the increase in future performance of these scapegoating teams is smaller as
compared to non-scapegoating teams. However, this effect is not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels. Our results thus provide evidence for the existence
of scapegoating in poorly performing teams and its potential negative consequences
for future performance development.
For illustrative purposes, we can apply our experimental design to our leading
example of the situation of a football team and its coach by considering the position
and strategic behavior of the coach as well as the decisions made by each individual
within the team and the team as a whole. In our design, the coach has a leveraging
effect on team output and thus on final team payoff. The incentive of each subject
should be to maximize individual effort, as this increases the probability of winning
the game and thus final payoffs. This could mirror the real-life situation where the
coach of a football team can provide strategic advice tailored to achieve optimal
results, but has no direct influence over the players’ performance in it. Also, the
real-effort game used as performance task could reflect the situation during a foot-
ball match: Not only do team members have to maximize individual effort, but
also, the effort exerted by the weakest player is most likely to represent the binding
constraint of the overall result that the team can achieve. Other applications can
be made with appropriate care.
Having shown that there is mild evidence for scapegoating (see hypothesis H1),
one can now venture forth into studying possible reasons which underlie this phe-
nomenon. One possible conjecture is that scapegoating may be triggered through
cognitive dissonance, a mental state describing the discrepancy between perceived
individual ability to perform well on a given task and the realization that the corre-
sponding outcome does not measure up to one’s expectations. Restoring self-esteem
is then accomplished by blaming a third party in order to feel better about oneself
(see Chang, Solomon, and Westerfield [2016]). The attempt to reduce cognitive
dissonance after bad performance could be one reason for losing teams to replace
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their coaches. The first channel of scapegoating described in the model by Roth-
schild, Landau, Sullivan, and Keefer [2012] may provide a theoretical foundation
for such a project. Hence, one may expand the experimental design by adding an
appropriate treatment to investigate this aspect.
While our data indicates that there might be evidence for hypothesis H2 as
we find effects that go in the postulated direction, we do not find that these are
significantly different from zero just yet. However, this might change if more data
are available. Hence, we suggest to re-run the experiment on a larger scale in
order to obtain more observations and thereby improve statistical power for the
negative effect of scapegoating on future team performance. Along these lines,
one may also expand the current analysis toward an econometric assessment of
individual responsibility attribution choices of which an additional advantage is to
control for the team members’ ability in solving the calculation problems presented.
This procedure would allow for a robustness check to establish that increased team
contributions actually stem from increased effort, as postulated in Section 2.4, as
well as for studying whether individuals with higher ability are able to improve
faster over time than individuals with lower ability.
Some scholars may argue that the problem of convex payoffs could arise from the
theoretical existence of ambiguity regarding the coaches’ effective quality. Their line
of argument would evolve around the statement that coaches are drawn from the top
20% of subjects in the pre-session, which could give rise to gambling, emphasizing
the relevance of individual beliefs about the distribution of coach performance.
Being unable to alter personal ability in performing the real-effort game in the short
run, the only option for the poorly performing subject in each team to increase the
probability of winning the subsequent game is to vote for a replacement of the coach,
thereby speculating to obtain a better coach in period 2. Hence, the dismissal
of any coach is said to be rational if there exists a positive probability of the
replacement coach to perform better than the previous coach. We can address this
conflicting point of view in three ways. One, our results show that 77% of poorly
performing subjects in losing teams correctly believe themselves to be the main
responsible party for their game’s outcome. This may be regarded as an indication
toward non-gambling behavior in the majority of the subject population. Two,
the dismissal of coaches would only be rational for x ≤ 6, which was not realized
among the top 20% in the pre-session. However, an additional control treatment
where coaches make contributions of x ≤ 6 could provide more insights about
the salience of this argument. And three, a control treatment with fixed-ability
coaches and replacement coaches could be conducted in order to check whether
the observed scapegoating pattern changes if subjects know that the replacement
coach cannot have better (or worse) contribution power than their initial coach. A
simple implementation of this idea is to re-run the experiment while making x = 9
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common knowledge.
An alternative way to test for rational dismissals is the introduction of an ac-
tive coach into the main sessions of the experiment, where one could investigate
whether a coach’s performance increases upon his dismissal.13 If this is the case,
rationality of the previous dismissal could be confirmed, which would provide ev-
idence against scapegoating. This builds on our rational benchmark that poorly
performing coaches can be rationally dismissed. While a concluding statement is
not possible at this point, note that the performance of both the coach and the
replacement coach proved to be identical in the pre-session (x = 9). Hence, from
an objective point of view, a subject’s decision to opt for the dismissal of his coach
cannot be interpreted as being rationally motivated, since there is technically no
scope for improvement in coach performance through replacement. As such, scape-
goating as a psychologically founded reason for voting in favor of the replacement
of the coach is sensible.
If a coach knows that he has to resign if his team fails to win an important
match, he may be more likely to approach the match with the respective negative
mindset. He might either decide not to put maximum effort into preparing the
team, or make bad decisions under stress. Hence, in an experimental setting with
an active coach, one could also study the behavior of the latter in more detail.
Likewise, the implementation of a control treatment where the replacement of
coaches is not possible under any circumstance can provide additional insights into
behavioral patterns when scapegoating is not feasible. A comparison with the
results presented in this paper could be informative about whether guiding agents
should stay fixed for a certain period of time in order to improve group performance.
Another group of scholars might regard prospect theory as a possible explanation
for scapegoating behavior. According to the four-fold pattern of risk preferences,
agents are relatively more risk seeking after experiencing losses with medium-sized
probabilities. With a probability of 12 of losing the game in period 1, where losing
means a reduction of the respective subject’s initial endowment, our setting cap-
tures the pattern’s prerequisites. Dismissing the coach could thus be motivated by
gambling behavior as predicted by the four-fold pattern. However, our results sug-
gest that the underlying mechanism seems to be more complex than conjectured at
first glance: We find that subjects who scapegoat tend to be relatively more (rather
than less) risk averse, or, in other words, they tend to be relatively less (rather than
more) risk seeking, which is contradictory to what prospect theory predicts.
Finally, one could also study whether scapegoating is independent of the level
13Recall that the experimental setting in this paper is such that coaches are only represented
by their performance data from the pre-session in which they were selected for their respective
positions based on their placing among the top 20% of study participants. Hence, their perfor-
mance is intrinsically constant over time in the main sessions. An analysis of coach performance
development is thus not feasible in this setting.
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of performance, and if so, why this might be the case. Quite bizarre an example is
that of the Icelandic national football team’s coach who resigned after the team lost
the match in the round of the last sixteen at the European Championships 2016,
despite the fact that this has been by far the best result of the Icelandic national
team in its entire history. When actually this should have been considered a huge
success, given that this team had never even qualified for the Europeans before, it
was in fact treated as a failure because the team lost in the end. Hence, it would be
interesting to study whether scapegoating can arise at any relative level of losing
or failure.
Hence, future research may be directed toward a wide array of different aspects.
Scapegoating seems to be an important and potentially harmful, yet not very fre-
quently studied aspect of team dynamics. We believe this to be a very interesting
area of research in behavioral economics which should be addressed in more detail,
and targeted at increasing team performance in all areas of public life.
66
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Instructions for the pre-session14
General instructions for study participants
Welcome to and thank you for participating in today’s study. The study will take
approximately 60 minutes.
In this study you can earn money. The amount that you will earn depends on
your decisions and on the decisions of the other study participants. All earnings
that you will make in this study will be shown to you in Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) first, where the following conversion between ECU and CHF applies:
20 ECU = 1 CHF
resp.
1 ECU = 0.05 CHF
At the end of today’s study, all earnings that you will have made will be con-
verted into CHF using the above conversion rate. In any case, you will receive a
participation fee of 15 CHF. You earnings will be paid to you in cash.
In order to earn money in this study, it is very important that you read the
following instructions carefully.
During the study, you are not allowed to talk to other participants or
use electronic devices. Non-observance of this rule will lead to exclusion from
this study and all payments.
On the following pages, the course of this study will be described in detail.
Please read this description carefully. On a supplementary sheet you will find a
number of comprehension questions. Please answer these questions and raise your
hand afterward. We will then come to your seat to check your answers and set-
tle any remaining questions. Please wait until the answers of all participants are
checked and there are no further questions. The study will begin afterward.
Description of the study
Today’s study consists of 10 rounds. In each round, your task is to solve calcula-
tion problems in your head within a certain time period. Within one minute,
you should try to solve as many calculation problems as possible. Each calculation
problem consists of adding three two-digit numbers between 10 and 99. Here is an
14The first section is written along the lines of the instructions used in Brune [2011]. The
instructions distributed to the subjects were written in German.
67
example:
21 + 45 + 83 = . . .
Ten such problems will be shown in each round. For each correctly solved problem
you will receive one point. At the end of each round, the number of points that
you obtained in this round will be shown to you on the screen.
At the end of round 10, the average number of problems that you solved correctly
(and thus your average number of points) over all rounds will be calculated.
If this average number of points puts you in the top 20% of all participants
of today’s study, you will receive a bonus of 100 ECU. Furthermore, your
payment will include a remuneration of 40 ECU per point for the number of
points that you obtained in a randomly selected period.
In order to prepare for the task (solving calculation problems in your head), you
will perform a trial round on the screen before the beginning of the actual study.
This is for you to familiarize yourself with the task’s format and type before the
actual study begins.
Your earnings at the end of today’s study thus consists of your participation fee
of 15 CHF as well as the number of points from a round being randomly selected
from all ten rounds, which will be remunerated with 40 ECU per point. If you are
among the top 20% of all participants of today’s study, you will also receive the
bonus of 100 ECU.
Finally, at the end of today’s study you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire
on the computer screen.
Comprehension questions
Now, please answer the enclosed comprehension questions regarding the procedure
of today’s study and raise your hand afterward. We will then come to your seat
to check your answers and settle any further questions. As soon as all answers of
all participants have been checked and there are no further questions, please wait
until the study begins.
2.7.2 Control questions and solutions for the pre-session
Question 1: How many rounds are there in today’s study?
Answer: 10.
Question 2: Assume that in any round, you solved 9 problems and 8 of those were
solved correctly. Also assume that this round is selected for your payment. How
many ECU will you receive in this case?
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Answer: 8 · 40 = 320.
Question 3: Assume that your average number of points at the end of the study
is six, and assume that this puts you in the top 30% of all participants of today’s
study. In this case, will you receive the bonus of 100 ECU for sure?
Answer: No: for the bonus it is required to be among the top 20%.
Question 4: Assume that you solved 7, 8, 6, 9, 4, 7, 5, 9, 10, and 6 problems
correctly in the respective rounds, and that with the resulting average number of
points of 7.1 you will be among the top 20% of all participants of today’s study.
Also assume that the randomly selected number of points is 5. In this case, which
payment will you receive at the end of today’s study (including the participation
fee)?
Answer: 5·4020 +
100
20 + 15 = 30.
2.7.3 Instructions for the main session15
General instructions for study participants
Welcome to and thank you for participating in today’s study. The study will take
approximately 60 minutes.
In this study you can earn money. The amount that you will earn depends on
your decisions and on the decisions of the other study participants. All earnings
that you will make in this study will be shown to you in Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) first, where the following conversion between ECU and CHF applies:
20 ECU = 1 CHF
resp.
1 ECU = 0.05 CHF
At the end of today’s study, all earnings that you will have made will be con-
verted into CHF using the above conversion rate. In any case, you will receive a
participation fee of 15 CHF.16 You earnings will be paid to you in cash.
In order to earn money in this study, it is very important that you read the
following instructions carefully.
During the study, you are not allowed to talk to other participants or
use electronic devices. Non-observance of this rule will lead to exclusion from
this study and all payments.
15The first section is written along the lines of the instructions used in Brune [2011]. The
instructions distributed to the subjects were written in German.
16In the pilot session, the show-up fee was 10 CHF.
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On the following pages, the course of this study will be described in detail.
Please read this description carefully. On a supplementary sheet you will find a
number of comprehension questions. Please answer these questions and raise your
hand afterward. We will then come to your seat to check your answers and set-
tle any remaining questions. Please wait until the answers of all participants are
checked and there are no further questions. The study will begin afterward.
Description of the study
Today’s study consists of two rounds. You are the member of a team of two team
members in total. You will be randomly assigned to either team A or team B.
Moreover, each team has a coach. The task for each team and its coach is to collect
as many points as possible during a productive game. Your team and your coach
will play against another team with their coach:
The team with the larger number of points wins in this round.
The productive game consists of solving calculation problems in your head
within a certain time period. Within one minute, you should try to solve as many
calculation problem as possible. Each calculation problem consists of adding three
two-digit numbers between 10 and 99. Here is an example:
21 + 45 + 83 = . . .
Ten such problems will be shown in each round. For each correctly solved problem
you will receive one point. The same applies for the other team member and the
coach. The total number of points for your team is then calculated as follows:
team points = coach’s points * (your points + your teammate’s points)
This number of points of the team determines the game’s result. The team with
the larger number of points will win.
Each study participant starts out with an endowment of 200 ECU. If your
team wins, then you and the other team member will each receive the difference
between the number of points of your team and the number of points of the other
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team in ECU. If your team loses, this amount will be subtracted from your and the
other team member’s endowment:
distance to other team = your team points - other team’s points
Here is an example: Assume that in round 1, your team generates 80 points
more than the other team and thus wins the game. In this case, you and the other
team member will receive 80 points each to be added to your endowment of 200
ECU. Your endowment thus increases to 280 ECU. Each member of the other
team, who lost the game by 80 points, will lose 80 points each of their endowment.
Their endowment thus decreases to 120 ECU.
The respective coach is not sitting with you in today’s study, but already par-
ticipated in a previous study. There he solved the same problems in the same
time as you will do today, however over 10 rounds. One of his number of points
was randomly selected from among these 10 rounds, saved, and used for this study.
Your coach was randomly selected from among the top 20% of participants of
this previous study based on the average number of points achieved at the end of
these 10 rounds.
After the game, the number of points of each team is calculated and thus the
game’s result determined. You will be informed about whether you won or lost
against the team that your played against, as well as by how many points you
won or lost. You will also receive information about the amount by which this
changes your current endowment and about the number of points of some
study participants involved.
Afterward, you will be asked who, in your opinion, bears the main re-
sponsibility for your game’s outcome. You will have the following response
options:
◦ the coach
◦ yourself
◦ the other team member
◦ the team (that is, yourself and the other team member together)
You and the other team member will choose their answers at the same time.
Afterward, your response will be send to the other team member and at the
same time, you will receive the response of the other team member.
If your team lost and both you and your teammate think that the coach is
responsible for this, then he will be replaced in the next round. Your team will
then get a new coach who also belonged to the top 20% of participants of the
previous study. If your team won, the coach cannot be replaced.
A second round of the same game follows, in which you will play against the
same team as before. However, there will be no more voting as the game ends
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after two rounds.
In order to prepare for the task (solving calculation problems in your head),
you will perform a trial round on the screen before the beginning of the actual
study. This will only cover the calculation part. This is for you to familiarize
yourself with the task’s format and type before the actual study begins.
Your earnings at the end of today’s study consists of your participation fee, your
initial endowment of 200 ECU as well as your gains or losses from the two games
in rounds 1 and 2.
Finally, at the end of today’s study you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire
on the computer screen.
Comprehension questions
Now, please answer the enclosed comprehension questions regarding the procedure
of today’s study and raise your hand afterward. We will then come to your seat
to check your answers and settle any further questions. As soon as all answers of
all participants have been checked and there are no further questions, please wait
until the study begins.
2.7.4 Control questions and solutions for the main session
Question 1: How many rounds are there in today’s study?
Answer: 2.
Question 2: Out of how many study participants does your team consist?
Answer: 2.
Question 3: You start out with an endowment of 200 ECU. If your team wins by
50 points in the first round, what is your updated endowment after round 1?
Answer: 200 + 50 = 250.
Question 4: You start out with an endowment of 200 ECU. If your team loses
by 90 points in the first round and wins by 10 points in the second round, what is
your updated endowment at the end of round 2?
Answer: 200− 90 + 10 = 120.
Question 5: Assume that your updated endowment at the end of the study is
240 ECU. In this case, which payment will you receive in CHF (including the
participation fee)?
Answer: 24020 + 15 = 27.
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Question 6: If your coach contributes 10 points and you and the other team
member contribute 8 points together, what is the number of points for the team?
Answer: 10 · 8 = 80.
Question 7: Assume that your coach solved 7, 8, 6, 9, 4, 7, 5, 9, 10, and 6 problems
correctly in the respective rounds, and that with the resulting average number of
points of 7.1 he was among the top 20% of all participants of the previous study.
How many points will he be able to contribute as a minimum and as a maximum
then?
Answer: The coach will be able to contribute at least 4 points and at most 10
points, where his contribution is a random selection from among the ten rounds.
Question 8: In which case will the coach be replaced for round 2?
Answer: The coach will be replaced if both members of a losing team attribute
responsibility for this outcome to the coach in the first round.
73
74
References
Bartling, B., and U. Fischbacher (2012): “Shifting the blame: On delegation
and responsibility,” Review of Economic Studies, 79(1), 67–87.
Boeker, W. (1992): “Power and managerial dismissal: Scapegoating at the top,”
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(3), 400–421.
Brown, K., and C. White (2010): “Organization–public relationships and crisis
response strategies: Impact on attribution of responsibility,” Journal of Public
Relations Research, 23(1), 75–92.
Brune, A. (2011): “Endogenous authority: Design and analysis of a laboratory
experiment,” Master’s thesis, Department of Economics, University of Zurich.
Chang, T., D. Solomon, and M. Westerfield (2016): “Looking for someone
to blame: Delegation, cognitive dissonance, and the disposition effect,” Journal
of Finance, 71(1), 267–302.
Fischbacher, U. (2007): “Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic ex-
periments,” Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178.
Gamson, W., and N. Scotch (1964): “Scapegoating in baseball,” American
Journal of Sociology, 70(1), 69–72.
Gibbons, R. (1992): A primer in game theory. Prentice Hall, England.
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky (1979): “Prospect theory: An analysis of deci-
sion under risk,” Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
Rothschild, Z., M. Landau, D. Sullivan, and L. Keefer (2012): “A dual-
motive model of scapegoating: Displacing blame to reduce guilt or increase con-
trol,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(6), 1148–1163.
75

Part III
Appendix
77

Appendix A
The war puzzle: Contradictory effects of interna-
tional conflicts on stock markets1
Amelie Brune, Thorsten Hens, Marc Oliver Rieger, Mei Wang
Abstract. We study stock market reactions to large international military con-
flicts since World War II. Using a news analysis proxy for the estimated likelihood
that a conflict will result in a war, we find that an increase in the war likelihood
tends to decrease stock prices, but the ultimate outbreak of a war increases them.
In cases when a war starts surprisingly, however, the outbreak of a war decreases
stock prices. We show that this puzzle cannot be explained by risk or ambiguity
aversion or by expectations about a quick end of the war.
JEL classification: G11, G14, G19.
Keywords: International conflicts, war, stock market reaction, news analysis,
behavioral finance.
1This paper is published as Brune, A., Hens, T., Rieger, M.O. et al. Int Rev Econ (2015) 62:
1. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-014-0215-7.
A.1 Introduction
“Buy on the sound of the cannon, sell on the sound of the trumpet.” is an old
proverb from the Napoleonic wars, attributed to London financier Nathan Roth-
schild. It suggests that the start of a war is a good time to buy stocks and that
they should be sold once the war is over. The rationale behind this advice is that
investors tend to overreact to the bad news of a coming war, leading to underpric-
ing, and that they overreact to the good news of the end of a war in a similar way,
leading to overpricing.
Economists have been concerned with the causes and consequences of interna-
tional military crises for more than 100 years, one of the first contributions being
the work of Keynes [1919]. Further work focused on the interplay between econ-
omy and war (Holsti and North [1966], Russett and Hanson [1975], and Collier and
Hoeﬄer [1998]), as well as on the impact of war on financial markets throughout
history (Frey and Kucher [2000]).
Recently, the financial market reaction induced by international conflicts has
received substantial interest in finance. News analysis has been used to reflect
the perceived risks and consequences of wars. In an early pioneering study using
content analysis of news, Holsti and North [1966] demonstrate that security prices
are related to rising international tensions during the outbreak of World War I. In
a more general framework, Niederhoffer [1971] codes the headlines on world events
on a seven-point good-bad scale in order to examine the impacts of news, and
Cutler, Poterba, and Summers [1998] analyze the stock market reaction to world
news (including wars) from 1926 to 1985. To quantify the effect of international
conflicts on stock prices, Goldstein [1992] constructed a scale to code conflictive
versus cooperative events that can be used to assess the impact of war risk, as it
was pointed out by Schneider and Troeger [2006]. There are further studies on the
relation between world news and financial markets, in particular during times of
crises: Elmendorf, Hirschfeld, and Weil [1996] study British bond market reactions
to news by comparing weeks with important news to those without such news.
Similarly, Rigobon and Sack [2005] distinguish the days with war-related news to
those without these news to measure the impact of war risk on financial markets.
Whereas all of these studies either consider particular conflicts or the impact of
war risk on financial markets during (at first glance) peaceful times, in this paper
we want to focus on a slightly different aspect, namely wars with a “prologue”,
i.e., wars which follow a period of tension. In this type of war, we distinguish two
phases: In the first phase, where cannons are still silent, there is an increasing
danger of a war, possibly interrupted by times of hope for a peaceful resolution.
Afterward, in the second phase, the “sound of the cannon” starts and war breaks
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out.
The surprising finding of our analysis is that often the reaction of the stock
market to the likelihood of a war is different between these two phases: Whereas
in the pre-war phase an increased likelihood of war decreases market prices, the
outbreak of the war itself, so to speak the increase in the likelihood from 99 to
100%, increases market prices. On the day of the outbreak of some specific war,
news coverage is clearly focused on this particular event. The development of the
stock market index then reflects the market’s reaction to and evaluation of the
event, which is thus far from random.
We observe this striking puzzle for a number of larger wars, including the Iraq
War and World War II. In all cases, we study the impact on the US stock market
as measured by the S&P 500 or Dow Jones Industrial Average. To complement our
results, we also analyze all other international crises with large impact since World
War II, in particular wars that started unexpectedly, such as the Korean War.
This paper is organized as follows. Section A.2 discusses different proxies to
estimate the likelihood of war. Section A.3 analyzes the Iraq War in 2003 using dif-
ferent likelihood measurements and shows that a puzzle in the development of stock
prices along the evolvement of this international crisis can be observed. Using fur-
ther examples of international wars in Section A.4, we show that this phenomenon
does not seem to be restricted to the war in Iraq. Section A.5 discusses possible
explanations for the puzzle and rejects some – at first glance natural – explanations.
Section A.6 concludes.
A.2 Estimating the likelihood of war
To analyze market reactions to changes in war likelihood, we first need to find
appropriate proxies for this likelihood. To this end, we analyze the Iraq War as
several independent estimates for the probability of war are available here. This
war then serves as a benchmark to establish a simple yet robust proxy using news
that we can then readily apply to earlier wars where other data are not available.
The Iraq crisis started to become serious on January 28, 2003, when President
George W. Bush announced a possible attack on Iraq even in the absence of a
UN resolution legitimating this course of action. After the ultimatum proposed
to Saddam Hussein on March 17 to leave Iraq within 48 h had expired, the first
military intervention by the USA started immediately in the early morning of March
20. Later that morning, President George Bush formally announced the Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
Following Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2009], we use two independent estimates for the
probability that a war would take place in Iraq: The first is the so-called Saddame-
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ter, an expert estimate for the likelihood of an invasion of Iraq which was published
on a daily basis by William Saletan on www.slate.com. This estimate provides us
with data from November 2002 to March 18, 2003. The second is the so-called Sad-
dam Security, a security that existed on the online exchange www.tradesports.com
and which was designed to pay a certain amount if and only if Saddam Hussein,
president of Iraq, were still in power at a certain date. As a war was expected to
end his rule over Iraq, Saddam Security prices gave a good probability estimate
for the likelihood of war before the designated date (see Amihud and Wohl [2004]).
This security was available with different maturity dates, where only March 2003
and June 2003 securities had a long enough price series. We use the June security,
as the pattern of the March security is somehow obfuscated by the fact that even
though the probability for a coming war increased, it was at times not at all clear
whether the eventual war was over before the end of March.
Saddam Security June Iraq War news
Saddameter ρ = 0.86 ρ = 0.66
N = 56 N = 81
Saddam Security June ρ = 0.64
N = 78
Table A.1: Correlations between different proxies for the probability of war. All
correlations are significant at the 1% level and use the largest available number of
days from the discussed time series.
As another proxy we studied news data from the New York Times. We counted
how many articles with the key words “war” and “Iraq” appeared in each day’s issue.
To show that this variable is closely related to the above-mentioned probability
measurements and that it provides the same qualitative indications about the war
likelihood, we regress each of the two measurements (i.e., the Saddameter and the
Saddam Security) on our news proxy. The results are reported in Table A.1. We
see that the news variable is positively correlated with the Saddameter, that is, the
expert measurement on the war likelihood and the number of (mostly negative)
news items run in the same direction. The comovement between the Saddameter
and the news variable between November 2002 and March 2003 is depicted in Figure
A.1(a) and is negatively related to the development of the S&P 500. Similarly, the
news proxy is positively related to the Saddam Security.
A.3 The Iraq War puzzle
As mentioned earlier, a puzzle can be observed when analyzing data of stock market
prices prior to and at the onset of a war. The relation between stock market prices
and the probability of an international conflict developing into a war is negative
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Figure A.1: Development of the S&P 500 at the beginning of the Iraq War. The
largest local R2 was reached for t˜ = March 18, 2003, while the invasion of Iraq took
place two days later on March 20, 2003.
as long as the conflict is still evolving. However, it becomes positive at the actual
onset of the war, thus a positive shock in the stock market can be observed when
the war likelihood increases to 100%. In other words, an increasing war likelihood
seems to decrease stock prices, while the outbreak of the war itself seems to increase
them. This is what we call the “war puzzle”.
To provide empirical evidence for this puzzle, we begin with an analysis of the
Iraq War in 2003. The main reason for this approach is the fact that for this war,
we are able to use two alternative measurements of the probability of war, namely
the Saddameter and the news variable described in Section A.2. As previously
explained, this has the advantage that we are able to conduct econometric analyses
for both types of probability measures in the same war. Hence, showing that the
news variable is a valid proxy for war likelihood, we can then use this variable to
analyze periods of war where no alternative probability measures are available.
Intercept Intercept and trend
Levels SP500 −1.5167 −2.5662
news 0.1771 −7.0122***
Saddameter −0.5129 −1.8901
First differences SP500 −9.6884*** −9.6221***
news −7.7683*** −7.8207***
Saddameter −7.8386*** −7.7840***
Table A.2: Iraq War: ADF test statistics for unit roots. * denotes significance at
10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% level.
Analyzing the characteristics of the S&P 500, news, and the Saddameter, we find
that these time series are non-stationary in levels, but stationary in first differences
(see Table A.2 for augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics for unit roots). Moreover,
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Intercept Intercept and trend
Levels εt = SP500t − β0 − β1newst −3.0972** −5.4364***
εt = SP500t − β0 − β1Saddametert −3.8389*** −3.7985**
First differences εt = SP500t − β0 − β1newst −13.2052*** −13.1416***
εt = SP500t − β0 − β1Saddametert −9.2592*** −9.2003***
Table A.3: Iraq War cointegration tests: ADF test statistics for unit roots in
residuals εt.
we find evidence for a cointegrating relationship between the S&P 500 and each
probability measure of order one (see Table A.3). This leads us to the choice of an
error correction model to appropriately model the relation between the US stock
market and war likelihood. The econometric models employed to study the stock
market in the pre-war phase are
∆SP500t−1 = β1∆SP500t−2 + β2∆newst + γ[SP500t−2 − α0 − α1newst−1] + εt
∆SP500t−1 = β1∆SP500t−2 + β2∆Saddt−1 + γ[SP500t−2 − α0 − α1Saddt−1] + εt
where ∆SP500 measures absolute daily changes in the S&P 500, and the error
correction parameter γ captures the degree to which deviations from an equilibrium
in the previous period (captured by the error term) affect current values. Hence,
γ is expected to be negative if a long-run equilibrium relationship prevails. Note
that the functional form of most models used in this and the following sections
is such that the explanatory variable is lagged forward relative to the dependent
variable. While this may seem slightly counterintuitive at first sight, the reason
is that there is a certain delay between the stock market pricing an event and its
actual publication in the newspaper.2
The estimated coefficients are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table A.4. Both
news and the Saddameter are highly significant at the 1 and 5% level, respectively,
and indeed indicate a negative relationship between stock prices and war likeli-
hood. An increase in the probability of war is thus associated with decreasing
stock market prices.3 In particular, an increase in the difference of the number of
news items, ∆newst, by one unit leads to a decrease in the difference in the S&P
500, ∆SP500t−1, by 0.507 points. Similarly, an increase in the difference of the
Saddameter value, ∆Saddt−1, by one percentage point leads to a decrease in the
2Standard predictive models are often constructed such that changes in variables at time t+ 1
are explained by changes in variables at time t. In our case this approach would require to use a
variable for the war likelihood which realizes prior to actual changes in the stock market. However,
since our argument is to use the news proxy as a flexible probability measurement which is available
for different wars over time, the functional forms used here slightly differ from standard models
due to the delay of news publication. This, however, does not alter the models’ predictive power.
3Also, the error correction parameter γ is significantly negative as expected for both types of
probability measurements.
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War Iraq Iraq World War II Vietnam War Gulf War
Method ECM ECM first differences first differences first differences
Likelihood proxy news Saddameter news news news
∆newst−1 −0.1946** −0.1160*** −0.2207
(0.0741) (0.0384) (0.1324)
∆newst −0.5072*** −0.2844*** −0.0456 −0.2885**
(0.1835) (0.0863) (0.0384) (0.1281)
∆newst+1 −0.2651***
(0.0697)
newst−1 −3.6611***
(0.5644)
∆Saddt−1 −1.1147**
(0.4927)
Saddt−1 −2.3051***
(0.1892)
∆SP500t−2 −0.0530 0.0512 0.1588
(0.1104) (0.1110) (0.1170)
∆DJIt−2 −0.0004 0.1519***
(0.1181) (0.0553)
γ −0.2274*** −0.3940***
(0.0681) (0.1020)
Constant 0.1827 0.2032 0.1788
(0.1859) (0.1609) (0.3735)
R2 0.1680 0.2767 0.2276 0.0510 0.1098
N 78 78 69 311 72
From Nov 21, 2002 Nov 21, 2002 May 25, 1939 May 6, 1964 Oct 10, 1990
To Mar 18, 2003 Mar 18, 2003 Aug 31, 1939 Mar 12, 1965 Jan 1, 1991
Table A.4: Regression results for the effect of the war likelihood on stock prices.
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%,
and *** at 1% level.
difference in the S&P 500, ∆SP500t−1, by 1.112 points. The one-day lag in the
news variable can be attributed to the time required for physical publication of
the newspaper. Since both probability measures yield the same implications, they
may both be regarded as valid proxies, which ensures that we can employ the news
variable as a valid proxy also in periods where alternative probability measures are
not available.
To study the behavior of the stock market at the onset of the war, we conduct
an analysis for structural breaks in the development of the stock market index. To
this end, cumulative returns of the S&P 500 are regressed on a binary dummy Dt
defined as
Dt =
{
0 if t < t˜
1 if t ≥ t˜
where t˜ indicates a potential structural break, and a time window of size 514
around t˜ is used to obtain a set of models of type
SP500t = β0 + β1Dt + εt.
4That is, the data set ranges from t˜− 25 to t˜+ 25 days around t˜.
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That is, t˜ is varied over time until the largest associated R2 is found, where we
suppose that the actual onset of a war, and hence the observed structural break
denoted by t0, lies in close proximity.
5 Note that while we are aware of potential
problems of non-stationarity in the cumulative returns, our analysis of structural
breaks would not be feasible using first differences here. Our interest lies in potential
increases in stock market values at the beginning of a war, which has to be separated
from the question of average increases or changing trends. The problem thus is to
weight an interesting question with the obvious problems of not using differences
in the model in order to resolve the issue.
The results are illustrated in Figure A.1(b). The largest R2 obtained amounts
to 0.7665 and is associated with March 18, 2003, while on March 20, 2003, the
invasion of Iraq took place (R2 = 0.6898). Hence, the true structural break can be
relatively well predicted.6 The S&P 500 increases by 46.4 points at the time of the
predicted structural break and by 47.8 points at the time of the invasion two days
later. Although it may prove difficult to interpret this absolute change in the stock
market index at the onset of the war and compare it across conflicts, we refrain
from calculating relative changes, for instance. As the volume of news items clearly
differs over time, a comparison of relative values over time would be meaningless
and thus reveal no further insights for the analysis.
A.4 The war puzzle: A general phenomenon
The results of the previous section could either be a general phenomenon or just
an idiosyncrasy of the Iraq War. In this section, we therefore extend the analysis
to other wars with large international impact since World War II. We face two
problems here: First, we need to decide which wars to include, and second, the
number of large scale wars during this time was – fortunately – not big enough to use
a single econometric approach for all wars. Instead of performing a unified analysis,
we are forced to study the conflicts separately. As any event study involving data on
stock market indices during international military conflicts, our subsequent analysis
is necessarily based on a small number of observations.
We solve the above-mentioned selection problem by using the list of the most
costly wars to the USA (and thus arguably to the US economy) as composed by
5We use this type of structural break analysis since we are interested in whether there exists
an instantaneous jump in the stock market index at the onset of a war. An alternative question
would be whether there are possible changes in the trend of the stock market. For that purpose,
a model testing for changes in expected growth rates of stock returns may be appropriate (see
Amihud and Wohl [2004]).
6Note that the estimated structural break on March 18 coincides with the beginning of the US
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. Investors might have anticipated that this ultimatum would not
be agreed upon which caused an early rise in stock market values.
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Stephen Daggett7 (see Table A.5). In the following, we will study each of the wars
from this list, where we distinguish between wars with a surprising start and wars
with a longer prelude. Since the wars took place at very different times, with news
traveling at different speeds, the econometric models we apply necessarily differ in
details.
Costs in billion 2008 US$ % of GDP
World War II 4114 35.8
Korean War 320 4.2
Vietnam War 686 2.3
Gulf War 96 0.3
Iraq War 648 1.0
Afghanistan War 171 0.3
Table A.5: List of the most costly wars to the USA (source: Stephen Daggett, CRS
Report for Congress, Costs of Major U.S. wars, July 2008).
A.4.1 World War II (1939-1945)
To analyze World War II, two starting dates can be studied: On the one hand, the
German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and on the other, the Japanese
attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, dragging the USA into the war.
We first study the former event as it had a large prelude while we will study
the latter rather surprising one in Section A.4.6. To analyze it in an econometric
setting, a first differences approach of the form
∆DJIt−1 = β0 + β1∆DJIt−2 + β2∆newst+1 + β3∆newst + β4∆newst−1 + εt
is most appropriate. The stock market is described by absolute daily changes
in the Dow Jones Index, ∆DJI, and the war likelihood is from now on captured
by the news proxy as established in Section A.2, i.e., in this case the number
of articles in the New York Times featuring the key words “war” and “Poland”.
Figure A.2(a) depicts the relation between the Dow Jones Index and the probability
of war between June and September 1939. Column 3 of Table A.4 shows the
regression results obtained from estimating this equation. The marginal effect of the
news variable is significantly negative for all different lags ∆newst−1, ∆newst, and
∆newst+1, and ranges from -0.195 (∆newst−1) to -0.284 (∆newst) points. Figure
A.2(b) illustrates the results obtained from the structural break analysis of type
DJIt = β0 + β1Dt + εt.
7CRS Report for Congress, Costs of Major U.S. wars, July 2008.
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September 5, 1939, is identified as the most likely structural break in the data set
(R2 = 0.8274). In fact, this lies close to the German attack of Poland being the
critical event on September 1, 1939 (R2 = 0.7244). The time lag may be explained
by the slower speed of news publication at that time.
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
14.06.39 28.06.39 12.07.39 26.07.39 09.08.39 23.08.39
D
J I
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
n
e
w
s
DJI news
(a) Probability of a war
125
140
155
170
185
04.08.39 13.08.39 22.08.39 31.08.39 09.09.39 18.09.39 27.09.39
D
J I
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
R
²
DJI R²
(b) Structural break analysis
Figure A.2: Development of the Dow Jones Index at the beginning of World War
II. The largest local R2 was reached for t˜ = September 5, 1939, while the German
attack of Poland took place on September 1, 1939.
A.4.2 Vietnam War (1955-1975)
The Vietnam War distinguishes itself from other wars by the fact that its time line
is less clear, but the onset of the large scale US involvement is set in 1965. The
development of the Dow Jones Index and the news variable between February 1964
and March 1965 is depicted in Figure A.3(a).
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Figure A.3: Development of the Dow Jones Index during the Vietnam War. The
largest local R2 was reached for t˜ = April 15, 1965, which coincides with the first
US and South Vietnamese bombing of Viet Cong positions on that day.
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The most suitable model for this war is a time series approach of type
∆DJIt−1 = β0 + β1∆DJIt−2 + β2∆newst + β3∆newst−1 + εt.
The regression results for this model are presented in column 4 of Table A.4. Again,
we see a significant negative relation between the war likelihood and the devel-
opment of stock prices. Figure A.3(b) illustrates the results for the analysis of
structural breaks. We see that the ad hoc regression identifies April 15, 1965, as
the event associated with the largest coefficient of determination, R2 = 0.7860. In
fact, one critical event coincides with this date: It marks the first US and South
Vietnamese bombing of Viet Cong positions. The jump in cumulative returns is
significantly positive at the 1% level and amounts to an increase in the Dow Jones
Index by 28.01 points.
Note that, for the war in Vietnam, the analysis does not exactly describe the
pre-war period and the distinct outbreak of the war itself, but nevertheless proves
to be a useful method to analyze the reaction of cumulative stock returns to war
news within a prolonged period of tensions.
A.4.3 Gulf War (1990-1991)
The Gulf War8 started with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, and
ended with the defeat of Iraq by the USA and their allies on February 28, 1991.
The relevant date for our analysis is January 17, 1991, when the Operation Desert
Storm (with the goal of liberating Kuwait) was started by massive aerial bombing.
The Gulf War moved into its second and much larger phase then. As such, our
news series covers the time span up to this date, which can be interpreted as a
pre-war phase from the perspective of the USA and their allies.
Analyzing this relation with a time series approach, column 5 of Table A.4
shows the results. We see once more that there is empirical evidence for a significant
negative relation between news and stock market prices. The analysis for structural
breaks in the development of cumulative returns (see Figure A.4) identifies February
4, 1991, as the break point (R2 = 0.8457) which, however, lies some days after the
initial aerial bombing. In fact, the closest real event to this indication is the Battle
of Khafji being the first major ground battle in the Gulf War on January 29, 1991.
A.4.4 Afghanistan War (2001)
In contrast to the conflicts analyzed in the previous sections, the Afghanistan
War, starting in October 2001, had too short a prelude (beginning only after
Afghanistan’s involvement in the attack on September 11, 2001, became clear)
8The Gulf War is often also referred to as Second Gulf War or Persian Gulf War.
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Figure A.4: Development of the S&P 500 and explanatory power of structural break
analysis at the beginning of the Gulf War. The largest local R2 was reached for
t˜ = February 4, 1991, while the Battle of Khafji took place on January 29, 1991.
to be analyzed in an econometric setting. However, we can still perform an analysis
for structural breaks and show that there exists an increase in stock market prices
at the onset of the war. Figure A.5(a) depicts the development of the S&P 500 and
news between September and October 2001. Figure A.5(b) shows the empirical
results from the analysis for structural breaks. Again, an increase in the S&P 500
around the time of the start of the war can be identified.
A.4.5 Behavior of other large stock market indices
Do stock markets in other countries behave similarly to the US market? For the
two recent wars with a sufficiently long prelude, i.e., the Gulf War and the Iraq
War, Figure A.6 shows that Japanese, German, and European stock indices mirror
the development of the S&P 500 quite well. The analysis for structural breaks (see
Table A.6) shows particularly for the Gulf War simultaneous up-moves at the onsets
of war.9 The fact that the USA, Europe, and Japan are strongly interconnected
in economic terms may further account for the clear comovement of Nikkei, DAX,
and Eurostoxx which can be observed during these two wars in the Middle East. A
9Although it would be interesting to see how stock markets evolved in the countries were
war actually took place, this analysis is often not feasible. Either stock exchanges were not yet
institutionalized, or controlled by the government so that data would not be reliable, or data is
not available.
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Figure A.5: Development of the S&P 500 during the Afghanistan War. The largest
local R2 was reached for t˜ = October 12, 2001, while the air attack took place on
October 7, 2001.
similar, though less pronounced, comovement also exists for the Afghanistan War.10
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Figure A.6: Comovement of other stock market indices. For the sake of compara-
bility, the data series of Nikkei, DAX, and Eurostoxx are linearly transformed such
that all series have a mean equal to the mean of the S&P 500.
A.4.6 Wars “out of the blue”
So far we have analyzed wars that had a more or less pronounced prelude. However,
there are also some wars with a very fast and unexpected onset.11 Most notably,
these are:
10Due to issues of data availability, we could not perform a similar analysis for global wars
having occurred earlier in history.
11Li and Sacko [2002] find that an unexpected onset of a military dispute reduces bilateral trades
more severely.
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Critical event Estimated breaks
S&P 500, DJI Nikkei DAX Eurostoxx
Iraq War Mar 20, 2003 Mar 18, 2003 Mar 7, 2003 Apr 7, 2003 Feb 25, 2003
Gulf War Jan 29, 1991 Feb 4, 1991 Feb 5, 1991 Jan 30, 1991 N/A
Table A.6: Analyses for structural breaks in other large stock market indices.
• The start of the involvement of the USA in World War II (Pearl Harbor) on
December 7, 1941,
• The Korean War, which started with the rather unexpected invasion of South
Korea by North Korea on June 25, 1950,
• And finally the Gulf War, or more precisely, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
on August 2, 1990.
Pearl Harbor can indeed be interpreted as a surprising conflict. Although US
relations with Japan were deteriorating in 1941, the actual start of the war came
as a surprise: A representative survey by Gallup conducted a few days before
the attack on Pearl Harbor found that only 52% of Americans actually expected
“that the United States will go to war against Japan some time in the near future”
(Canadian Institute of Public Opinion [1941]). What happened was that, not “some
time in the near future”, but just a few days later, the war started – and not by the
USA going to war, but by the USA being attacked. This is in stark contrast to the
situation, e.g., in the Iraq War where the likelihood of a war was already estimated
to be above 90% several weeks before the start of the war (see Figure A.1(a)).
In all of these cases, we cannot expect to find the same pattern which we ob-
served before the outbreak of the wars analyzed in the previous section. There
is simply no pre-war phase that could be analyzed and where an increase in the
probability of war could decrease stock market prices.12
What we can observe, however, is whether the onset of a war led to a sudden
increase or decrease in stock market prices. A structural break analysis shows that
this is indeed the case for all three wars. However, the pattern is inverted: In all
three cases, stock market prices went down significantly at the outbreak of the war.
In the case of Pearl Harbor, the Dow Jones Index went down by nearly 3% in one
day, in the case of the Korean War by nearly 5%, and in the case of the Gulf War
by around 5.7% within a week.
A.4.7 What’s puzzling about the war puzzle
Our analysis so far has revealed quite a peculiar pattern: On the one hand, stock
prices tend to fall when the probability of a war increases and tend to rise when
there are signs for a peaceful resolution. However, the actual onset of the war will
12This holds true unless we studied intra-day data which in most of these cases is not available.
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increase stock market prices.
While this by itself is already puzzling, it becomes even more puzzling consid-
ering the evidence that we found about surprising wars (wars without a lengthy
prelude): Here, we observe that stock market prices tend to decrease once the war
breaks out. In other words, whether stock prices decrease or increase when a war
breaks out does not seem to depend much on the particular war but more on the
previous history or, more precisely, whether the war was surprising or not. But
even this observation cannot explain the discrepancy that one and the same war
first suggests a pattern that an increase in the likelihood of war decreases stock
market prices, but then ultimately, the onset of the war itself increases them. This
cannot easily be accommodated with the idea that stock market prices reflect ex-
pectations of the future economic development of a country.
Table A.7 summarizes the stock markets’ different reactions towards news for
all conflicts studied.
Stock market reaction to:
Increasing probability Expected start Surprising start
probability range (schematic) 0-99% 99-100% 0-100%
World War II (start in Europe) ↘ ↗
World War II (Pearl Harbor) ↘
Korean War ↘
Vietnam War ↘ ↗
Gulf War (Kuwait invasion) ↘
Gulf War (“desert storm”) ↘ ↗
Afghanistan War ? ↗
Iraq War (2003) ↘ ↗
Table A.7: Summary of stock markets’ reactions to news. ? indicates a lack of data
in order to investigate this point.
A.5 Attempts to explain the puzzle
A.5.1 War as a stimulus package for the US economy
The first idea about this puzzle might be that it is none: A war can be considered
as a stimulus package for the US economy and thus lead to an increase in stock
market prices.
However, this line of argument does not work for two reasons: First, Section
A.4.5 showed that the puzzle also seems to be present for countries which were not
involved in the respective war, such as, for instance, Germany in the Iraq War.
Second, the explanation fails to explain why before the war, prices fall whenever
the war becomes more likely.
Falling prices when war is looming and rising prices when war is starting: Only
the combination of these two observations makes the war puzzle a puzzle.
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A.5.2 Expectations about a quick end of the war
A natural idea is to consider the time dimension (Schneider and Troeger [2006]):
Once the war breaks out, it is clear that the trouble will be over soon, and thus,
investors buy stocks again. For example, the Saddam Security can be interpreted
as the likelihood of a coming war, but also as expected length of the war (Amihud
and Wohl [2004] and Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2009]). Chappell and Eldridge [2000]
also suggested psychological explanations such as “despair” and “renewed hope”
regarding the UK stock index reactions to the two sub-periods during World War
II. There are, however, at least three arguments that lead us to discard this natural
looking idea to explain our findings as well:
• Since the Saddam Security works well as a proxy for the estimated probability
of war, it is clear that investors did not expect the war to take place in the
distant future: Recall that the particular security that we studied would only
pay out if Saddam Hussein was out of power by June – not long after the war
indeed took place!
• While the positive expectation of a quick war that ends the costly and lengthy
tensions before might be true, e.g., for the war in Iraq (although with hindsight
it turned out to be overly optimistic), this cannot explain the pattern observed
at the onset of World War II, given that it was generally not expected that
this war would end quickly, given the experience of the four-year-long World
War I.
• The expectation of a quick end to the war cannot explain why investors do
not seem to appreciate the increase of the likelihood of a coming war earlier,
as this brings the war (and hence its end) closer.
A.5.3 Expectations about a devastating outcome of the war
For the Iraq War, another explanation for the fact that stock prices increased
while the war took its course is that, in this case, everybody was afraid of a truly
devastating outcome by means of weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out
that this did not happen, stock prices eventually increased.
However, this reasoning is neither able to explain why stock prices increased
already at the very start of the war – and not a bit later while Saddam Hussein still
had time to use weapons of mass destruction if he had them – nor can it explain why
the same pattern is observed in World War II, for instance, where this argument
fails to be applicable.
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A.5.4 The role of the USA within each conflict
There exists a large body of literature on the structure of conflicts from a political
perspective. The basic modeling idea is that an aggressor makes an initial surprising
move towards his opponent, who then reacts as a defender. Both aggressor and
defender can have allies to their aid.
One of the most influential publications within this literature is Schelling [1966].
Against the background of the potential use of nuclear weapons during the Cold
War, he argues that the purpose of military strategy became intrinsically based on
deterrence rather than ultimate victory over the opponent. Deterrence can thus be
interpreted as bargaining power to coerce the opponent to behave in a particular
way. While the author argues that this power is most successful when it is not
actually performed, but rather used as a threat, he also notes that, in reality,
this bargaining power is often conveyed by some performance of it. War is thus
interpreted as a particular type of bargaining process. Other authors argue that
war itself is a sign of the previous breakdown of the peaceful bargaining process
(see Powell [2002]).
In this paper, we use a data set on US news items and stock prices. An obvious
question to ask is thus which role the USA played in each of the conflicts analyzed
and to what extent this may have an impact on our results.
While there is no obvious relation between a possible aim of deterrence on the
part of the USA and the development of stock prices, a closer look at the overall
position of the USA reveals an interesting pattern: The USA played an active
role in the Vietnam War and the Gulf War (as ally to the defender) and in the
Afghanistan War and the Iraq War (as main attacker). In all of these conflicts,
stock prices increased at the onset of the war. At first sight, one may argue that
it is the active role of the USA which influenced the positive development of stock
market prices. However, all of these wars did also have a preceding period of
increased tension which makes it difficult to disentangle US participation and pre-
war phases as possible causes for the direction of stock market developments. This
argument can be supported by looking at all unexpected conflicts, namely Pearl
Harbor, the invasion of South Korea by North Korea, and the invasion of Kuwait
by Iraq. The USA was the attacked country in the case of Pearl Harbor, and an
ally to the defender in the Korean War as well as the Gulf War. In all three cases,
the USA had not yet assumed an active role within the conflict when stock prices
started to decrease. The same problem arises again: We cannot say whether it is
the type of role that the USA assumed or the character of the crisis that influences
the direction of stock price developments. However, there is one exception: When
stock prices began to increase at the onset of World War II in September 1939,
the USA had not yet assumed an active role, either. This can be interpreted as
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an indication toward the presence of the war puzzle, i.e., it is the structure of the
conflict that matters for stock markets, and not the military position or the goals
of the USA. But even if the driving force behind increasing stock prices at the onset
of a war is the participation of the USA, this does not resolve the “war puzzle”,
but rather raises the new question of how the active role of the USA influences the
stock market.
Also note that one might argue that the fact that catastrophic outcomes were
unlikely for the USA during World War II contradicts the fact that Germany pro-
ceeded with comprehensive propaganda related to weapons of mass destruction.
Their use did eventually not materialize. This seeming contradiction can be re-
solved by the interpretation of German propaganda as a non-plausible threat to
the USA. It may also be regarded as a deterrence towards the USA (see Schelling
[1966]). In particular, propaganda may have been used as a bargaining power to
prevent the USA from intervening.
A.5.5 Ambiguity-averse investors
An alternative explanation that seems to be natural is to assume that investors show
ambiguity aversion. At first, the ambiguity about the probability of a war breaking
out makes people shy away from the stock market and hence leads to lower stock
prices. This effect stops as soon as it becomes clear that a war is indeed starting
for sure and uncertainty is reduced (Schneider and Troeger [2006]). Guidolin and
La Ferrara [2010] suggest that the initiation of conflict can been seen as a sign of
resolve and investors tend to show positive reactions by buying stocks.
However, this seemingly natural behavioral explanation cannot accommodate
our empirical data, as ambiguity cannot make an ambiguous situation seem worse
than its worst possible outcome. In this situation, that would mean that, even
though the probability of the start of a war is uncertain and hence ambiguous, an
ambiguity-averse investor would still prefer this situation over a situation where the
war has started for sure.
A.5.6 Uncertainty about investment decisions
Another idea to resolve the puzzle is to consider the uncertainty about a war as an
uncertainty about the decision between different portfolio allocations: In the case
of a peaceful resolution, an investor should have invested in different assets than
in the case of a war. While it is uncertain which of the two outcomes will occur,
it might be optimal for an investor to stay out of the stock market entirely, or at
least to reduce their holdings substantially.
To study this idea more in detail, we describe a small model.
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When facing the possibility of the outbreak of a war, an investor has to decide
between investing in two different portfolios, a “war portfolio” that will be successful
if a war breaks out, and a “peace portfolio” that will be successful if the conflict
ends in a peaceful resolution. We summarize the four potential outcomes in the
following table13:
War breaks out Peaceful resolution
(probability p) (probability 1− p)
War portfolio a −b
Peace portfolio −c 1
Expected
payoff
p
1
-b
a
-c
p*
peace portfolio
war
 por
tfoli
o
Decreasing prices Increasing prices
Figure A.7: Investors switching from a “peace portfolio” to a “war portfolio” when
the probability of war increases beyond a threshold p∗ could explain the war puzzle.
Assuming that it is in any case bad for the investor to speculate on the wrong
outcome, we have a, b, c ≥ 0.
The expected payoff of the investor now depends on his portfolio decision. If he
decides on the war portfolio, it is ap− b(1− p). If he decides instead on the peace
portfolio, it is (1− p)− cp (see Figure A.7). Obviously, the war portfolio is better
for large values of p and worse for small values. As a short computation shows, the
cut-off point is at
p∗ =
1 + b
1 + a+ b+ c
.
This model indeed predicts the observed pattern: An increase in p makes the
13For simplicity, we normalize the investor’s return for a “peace portfolio” to one in the case of
a peaceful resolution.
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peace portfolio less and less attractive. Consequently, investors will sell the cor-
responding stocks. At the same time, however, the war portfolio is still even less
attractive, thus the falling prices of the peace portfolio stocks cannot be matched
by rising prices of stocks in the war portfolio. Once the probability of war reaches
p∗, the pattern changes: Now, war stocks become more and more attractive, and
thus, investors buy them and the overall market starts to rise.
In order to find a probability p∗ that is close to one and thus in line with our
empirical evidence, b needs to be sufficiently large, and thus, the potential loss when
choosing a war portfolio, but encountering a peaceful resolution, should be fairly
large.
Theoretically, we can explain the puzzle in this way, but how is it in reality?
How can we test empirically whether this model indeed explains the war puzzle?
The general idea is that different stocks should show a different pattern during
the different phases before an outbreak of the war: Stocks that are in the “peace
portfolio”, i.e., stocks that would benefit from a peaceful resolution of the conflict,
should initially be sold whenever the likelihood of a war increases. Thus, we would
expect them to follow the generally observed pattern of the stock market, but only
before the outbreak of the war: At that point, these stocks should not increase
significantly, as there is no reason for investors to purchase them once it is clear
that the “war portfolio” is the right investment.
Stocks in the “war portfolio” instead should follow the increase in the stock
market at the start of the war, but not its previous decrease whenever the war
became more likely.
A simple empirical test is now possible by looking at differences between sectors
that should clearly be in the war portfolio (weapon-related industry) and sectors
that should clearly be in the peace portfolio (e.g., travel-related industry). It turns
out, however, that as convincing as the theoretical idea is, it thoroughly fails this
simple but clear-cut test: In fact, whereas sectors that one would undoubtedly
assign to the peace portfolio (e.g., travel stocks, like airlines) increased most at the
outbreak of the war, stocks in the war portfolio (weapon manufacturers) did not.
To sum up, this explanation looks good in theory, but unfortunately does not
help to resolve the puzzle in reality.
A.5.7 Mean-variance preferences
Finally, there is a rather unexpected possible explanation for the phenomenon:
Classical mean-variance preferences. Indeed, this concept could explain the ob-
served data surprisingly well. One could argue that people do not buy when it is
unsure what is going to happen due to their variance aversion, even though the
expected return might still be a little bit better than when the war has finally
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started. In this sense, the observed phenomenon could be related to the mean-
variance paradox.
To formalize this idea, we assign average expected returns µW and µP to the
two potential outcomes (war and peace). We denote the probability of a war by p
and compute the variance of the two-outcome lottery (µW with probability p and
µP with probability 1− p) as
var(p) = (1− p)p(µP − µW )2.
The variance is zero for p = 0 (i.e., peace is sure) or p = 1 (i.e., war is sure) and
maximal for p = 1/2 (see Figure A.8).
μP
Expected
payoff
σ²
μW
p=0
p=½
p=1
p=p*
Figure A.8: Mean-variance preferences can explain the war puzzle. Here, µP and
µW are the returns in case of peace and war, respectively. σ is the variance of the
situation, depending on the probability of war. It is maximal when the probability
is 1/2 (maximal degree of uncertainty). The dashed lines are indifference curves,
i.e., they mark combinations of mean and variance on which an investor would
be indifferent. A certain war is preferred over an uncertain situation with a high
probability of war (points on the thick line).
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Typical indifference curves for a mean-variance investor with utility µ − ασ2
are also shown in Figure A.8. Looking at the indifference curve through the point
(0, µW ) (i.e., a certain war), we see that this investor would prefer a certain war
(p = 1) over a situation where p is large, but still smaller than one.
When the probability p increases from zero to one, at first the situation worsens
for the investor (who consequently would value stocks less), but after a certain point
(in our model at p∗ = (α− 1)/α, as a short computation shows), there is indeed a
perceived improvement for the investor, explaining the increase in stock prices at
the outbreak of a war.
A.6 Conclusions
We have observed that stock market prices react very sensitively to the probability
of the outbreak of a major war. The pattern that was shown for several wars
during the last century demonstrates that an increase in the likelihood of war
decreases stock prices and vice versa. What is puzzling, however, is that once a war
breaks out, stock market prices do not decrease further, but do the very opposite
and increase significantly. This was true for all wars with a more or less lengthy
prologue. Wars that occur “out of the blue” show a different pattern in that their
sudden outbreak tends to decrease stock market prices. These results are certainly
a challenge for classical asset pricing models.
Mean-variance preferences of investors might be able to explain the observed
pattern. There could, however, be different explanations for this puzzle based
on other behavioral factors. Future research, e.g., with the help of laboratory
experiments, might be able to shed more light on this puzzle.
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